

The Earlham Historical Journal Volume VIII: Issue I

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
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The Earlham Historical Journal

Established in 2008, we are an interdisciplinary journal that aims to publish works of outstanding research that employ a historical slant.

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This issue of the Journal focuses on a variety of scholarship from Earlham students, including works on the history of Indiana, scholarship concerning race-class connections in Latin America, Mary Tudor's place among the Tudor monarchs, and technology and nationalism in Japan.

Firstly, Soren Rasmussen's paper "Conviction and Circumstance: The Liberty Party in Indiana" uses Indiana Quaker's Liberty Party to examine the motivation of third party voters more broadly. He brings light to the little-known political party that gained popularity in Indiana in the 1840s on an anti-slavery platform.

Next, "Science, Technology, and Japanese Nationalism," by Joey Slucher, explores the relationship between Japanese national identity and the development of technology and science-focused industry. Slucher focuses on the changing nature of Japanese national identity post-World War II and the ways in which technology played a part.

Our next paper, "The Marian Court in Context: Mary Tudor's Court as Part of the Tudor Legacy," written by Emma Vroom, explores the contested place of Mary Tudor within her own time and the larger line of her family history.

Finally, Laura Honsig's "Ghosts of Violence," is a historiographical paper analyzing the race-class nexus of Latin America and how it is approached by three different historians. The paper focuses on the scholarly debate on whether or not Latin America departs from the typical colonial society, given its unique Mestizaje population.

The works in this issue of the journal draw from four different periods of history and employ varied approaches to

historical inquiry. As each of these papers takes on existing documents and scholarship they strive to shine light on aspects of history that have been overlooked or written out of other narratives, they represent the hard work of searching for truth that is at the core of research amongst students at Earlham College.

On behalf of the editorial board,

Mollie Goldblum & Olivia Hunter

Anyone interested in submitting articles for the Spring issue should contact Olivia Hunter (ochunter12@earlham.edu)

Conviction and Circumstance: The Liberty Party in Indiana

BY SOREN RASMUSSEN

Though American politics have long been dominated by a two party system, history contains several incidents in which a small third party was able to decide national elections. The most recent such instance was the 2000 presidential election in which Green Party Candidate Ralph Nader received 97,488 votes in the decisive state of Florida which the Republican Candidate George W. Bush won over Democrat Al Gore by a mere 537 votes. An older example of this phenomenon occurred in 1844 when the abolitionist Liberty Party took enough votes from Whig candidate Henry Clay in Michigan and New York to give Democrat James Polk the presidency. In both cases the third party hindered its intended cause, the Liberty Party helped to elect a President who dramatically expanded slave territory, and the Green Party prevented the election of Al Gore, who would later win a Nobel Prize for his environmental work. Why was there such support for third party movement that had little chance of winning elections and undermined largely sympathetic candidates?

The Indiana Liberty Party provides an excellent opportunity to study the motivations of third party voters and the circumstances that surround the creation and dissolution of third parties. The Liberty Party's single issue, opposition to slavery, lacked widespread appeal in the 1840's and within an already small movement, the Indiana Liberty Party was especially weak. Historians have traditionally considered it "not an important state for the Liberty Party" because it "exerted no

national or regional influence.”¹ Yet it is this weakness that makes Indiana a compelling place to study the Liberty Party. Though they were often accused of naiveté, abolitionists in Indiana were not unaware of the weakness of the movement within their state, and yet they continued to maintain politically and financially an organization that had no chance of obtaining their political goals. Why did they support a movement which appeared so futile at its conception?

Previous accounts of the Liberty Party in Indiana by historians Theodore Clarke Smith and Vernon Volpe have focused on the religiosity and idealism of the Liberty Party. They have explained it as a movement that primarily served the moral purity of its members rather than accomplish their political goals. Volpe and Smith rightly characterize Liberty Party supporters as deeply religious and concerned with separating themselves from the sin of slavery. However, in emphasizing the religious and moral convictions that produced the Liberty Party, they neglect the ways in which its abolitionist supporters acted in response to the political circumstances they faced. Members of the Liberty Party were not so fanatical that they never attempted to compromise and work within the two party system, nor were they so rigid that they did not respond to the changing political landscape of the 1840’s. Any account of the Liberty Party in Indiana must acknowledge not only the religious character of the abolitionist movement which produced the Liberty Party, but also the changing political realities abolitionists faced and the ways in which they responded to them.

¹ Johnson, *The Liberty Party, 1840-1848: Antislavery Third-party Politics in the United States*, 215.

Origins of Political Abolitionism

Abolitionists had traditionally seen themselves as part of a moral religious movement separate from the impious world of politics. However, during the 1830s many abolitionists recognized the failure of their current tactics and the ways in which anti-abolitionist political power was used against them. These abolitionists began to see political action as critical to their struggle against slavery and began the slow, controversial, and divisive process of politicizing the movement.² By the end of the decade abolitionists nationwide would test various political strategies and attempt to use the Federal Government to either end, or separate themselves, from the institution of slavery.

Emerging out of the revivalist fervor of the Second Great Awakening, the abolitionist movement had initially employed the tactic of “moral suasion” which attempted to convince slaveholders of their own sinfulness and relied on individual conversions. While some notable slaveholders did convert, by the 1830s it had become clear to many that slavery would never be eradicated by an ethical revolution among Southerners, and that “judged by its initial aims, moral suasion had failed utterly.”³ In addition to the disillusionment with moral suasion, the political tactics of their adversaries provided the impetus for some abolitionists to take up political action. Anti-abolitionists in the House of Representatives had enacted a gag rule to end the abolitionist petition campaign which had sent Congress 415,000 petitions denouncing slavery. The “gag rule”, passed by the House of Representatives in 1836, automatically tabled all anti-

² James Brewer Stewart, *Holy Warriors: The Abolitionists and American Slavery* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 46.

³ Stewart, *Holy Warriors*, 74.

slavery petitions before they were read and prevented them from becoming the subject of debate.⁴ Abolitionists and their northern sympathizers saw the gag rule as a violation of civil rights which could only be remedied through political action, giving it “an influential role in sectionalizing American politics and in politicizing abolitionism.”⁵

In addition to legal attacks on their civil rights, abolitionists suffered illegal attacks on their persons. Violence against abolitionists, and particularly against the abolitionist press, reached its peak in the years 1837-1838. Anti-abolitionist violence was an issue of particular concern to Indianan abolitionists. In its early days the Abolition movement in Indiana relied heavily on the Cincinnati based *Philanthropist*, which was attacked by several mobs. Furthermore, the most famous incident of anti-abolitionist violence, the murder of Elijah Lovejoy, took place in neighboring Illinois.⁶ Abolitionists needed the State to protect their right of free speech in congress, the freedom of their presses, and the safety of their persons and so began to seek political representation.

The concern of Indiana abolitionists over the violation of their civil liberties is reflected in the constitutions of many early anti-slavery societies, which decried the gag rule as a restriction of free speech. The Fayette County Anti-Slavery Society declared that “the right of petition has been virtually denied, and free discussion strangled in the General Councils of our nation.”⁷

⁴ Ibid, 84.

⁵ Stewart, *Holy Warriors*, 83.

⁶Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 23.

⁷ ANTI-SLAVERY MEETING, *Philanthropist*, May 21, 1839;
3. American Periodicals.

Indiana's first anti-slavery newspaper, the *Protectionist*, condemned both mob and government suppression of free speech in its statement of purpose, which read "we must padlock the press, tie up or tongues, and seal away or lips... lest we offend the despots."⁸ While Indiana abolitionists were clearly effected by the nationwide attempts to stifle debate on the subject, they were also influenced by powerful pro-slavery legislation passed in their own or nearby states. The Indiana State Anti-Slavery Society upon its creation, resolved to "petition the next Legislature of our state to repeal our statue laws relating to Negroes and Mullatoes,"⁹ while the Fairfield Society resolved that the Black laws "ought to be regarded by every Christian and philanthropist as worthy only of entire disregard."¹⁰ Ohio's Fugitive Slave Law of 1839, which made it a crime "to entice or aid a fugitive from labor, or interfere with the process of removal" was deplored by Indiana and Ohio abolitionists and condemned by additional meetings in Fairfield and Fayette County.¹¹ The success of pro-slavery or negrophobic legislation in Indiana and Ohio added local political issues to the national demand to end the gag rule.

In addition to the failure of moral suasion and the need to preserve civil rights through political action, some historians

⁸ Arnold Buffum, "Northern Rights", *Protectionist*, January 1, 1841.

⁹ James Donell, "PROCEEDINGS OF THE INDIANA STATE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION" *Philanthropist*, September 25, 1838, 2. American Periodicals.

¹⁰ Moses Wilder, "THE SPIRIT OF FREEDOM IN INDIANA", *Philanthropist*, March 12, 1839, 3. American Periodicals.

¹¹ Stephen Middleton, *The Black Laws: Race and the Legal Process in Early Ohio*. (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2005), 174.

have argued that economic factors also influenced the turn towards political abolitionism. In 1837 the United States underwent a severe economic crisis and abolitionists were quick to blame slaveholders for this misfortune, considering it “one of the many plagues to be suffered by a corrupt society that condemned such sins as slaveholding.”¹² The American Anti-Slavery Society resolved in 1840 “That the existence of Slavery is the grand cause of the pecuniary embarrassments of the country; and no real or permanent relief is to be expected... until the total abolition of that execrable system”¹³. Joshua Leavitt’s pamphlet “Financial power of slavery” explained the country’s financial woes as a product of the poor character of slave owners. Leavitt claimed that “The free expect to pay their debts, if it takes years of toil and self-denial; the slave holder likes to pay debts if it is convenient, but to work and save to pay an old debt enters not into his thoughts.”¹⁴ If the financial practices of the South were responsible for the nation’s distress, then only control of economic policy could keep them in check, and so Leavitt called for “direct resistance to the political domination of the Slave Power.”¹⁵

One might expect that Indiana’s bankruptcy after the crisis of 1837 would make Indiana abolitionists particularly receptive to arguments which blamed slaveholders for their misfortunes, but this rhetoric was slow to appear in their

¹² Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 17.

¹³ Fourth Annual Report of the Am. Anti-Slavery Soc., 52. Cited in Bretz, *The Economic Background of the Liberty Party*, 253.

¹⁴ Bretz, *The Economic Background of the Liberty Party*, 254-255.

¹⁵ Bretz, 255.

writings.¹⁶ Indiana abolitionists were more concerned that they might implicate themselves in the sin of slavery by financially supporting or benefitting from it, than they were about the role of slave power in the national economy. Many of Indiana's local Anti-Slavery Societies encouraged members to avoid goods produced by slave labor, and the state Anti-Slavery Society recommended at its formation that abolitionists "abstain as far as possible from the proceeds of unrequited labor."¹⁷ The tendency of Indiana abolitionists to emphasize personal piety over national policy was reflected in the states anti-slavery press by the failure of the *Protectionist* and the success of the *Free Labor Advocate*.

The *Free Labor Advocate* and the *Protectionist* were both Liberty Party newspapers founded in 1841 in the town of New Garden, Indiana. As its name would suggest, the *Protectionist* advocated "PROTECTION for our industry against a hopeless competition," and sought to demonstrate that "without a Protective Tariff, we of the north cannot ... have any market for our produce."¹⁸ Throughout its short run the *Protectionist* covered the financial malfeasances of the South in repaying their debts,¹⁹ the role of slavery in provoking the financial crisis,²⁰ the need for protective tariffs, and the inequity in distribution of proceeds

¹⁶ Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 17.

¹⁷ James Donell, "PROCEEDINGS OF THE INDIANA STATE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION", 2.

¹⁸ Arnold Buffum, "Northern Rights", *Protectionist*, January 1, 1841, 6.

¹⁹ Arnold Buffum "Great Rogues", *Protectionist*, May 1, 1841.

²⁰ Arnold Buffum, "State Debts", *Protectionist*, April 1, 1841.

from the sale of public lands.²¹ While the *Free Labor Advocate* echoed some of these national issues, it emphasized the boycott of slave made goods as a way of removing economic support for, and absolving oneself from, the sin of slavery. The emphasis on consumer boycotts over protective tariffs reflects the different economic relationships represents the differing economic relationships that the North and Midwest had with the South. Former New Yorker, Arnold Buffum, emphasized tariffs because that was the primary site of economic contention between the industrial North and the rural South. However, Indiana had no manufacturing and Midwesterners primarily saw the south as a market for their agricultural products. In part because it emphasized economic concerns that did not fit the state it was published in, the *Protectionist* ran for only a year before being canceled due to a lack of subscribers. The *Free Labor Advocate*, however, continued to print advertisements for goods produced without slave labor until the formation of the Free Soil Party in 1848.

While many disparate issues contributed to the rise of political abolitionism, Historian Julian Bretz has argued that the common factor in all of them was the threat they posed to northern whites. Bretz argues that political anti-slavery was “chiefly directed against the slave power as a political and economic force, and not against the existence of slavery in the states.”²² Bretz’s skepticism about the altruistic nature of political abolitionism was echoed by some contemporary non-political abolitionists who claimed the considerations of political

²¹ Arnold Buffum, “Tariff and Distribution”, *Protectionist*, July 1, 1841.

²² Bretz, *The Economic Background of the Liberty Party*, 264.

abolitionism “all center in the welfare of the white man.”²³ While the Liberty Party did emphasize personal piety and failed to better the lives of slaves, Bretz indulges in the tendency of 1930’s historiography to over-emphasize economic causes and ignores the battles fought against racist laws on the local level.

Abolitionists in Indiana were more concerned with avoiding the products of slave labor than the macro-economic effects of slave power. Furthermore, they adopted political tactics well before *The Protectionist* tried to make economic policy a central issue for the movement. Blaming the South for the Panic of 1837 is more likely an attempt to use sectional tension and economic hardship to attract others to the abolitionist movement, than a strategy designed to protect calculated economic interest. As Bretz admits, abolitionist economics “reflects as much prejudice as scientific analysis.”²⁴

In the 1830’s abolitionists nationwide developed diverse political goals that included federal trade policy, procedural rules in the House of Representatives, and local anti-black codes. Abolitionists would attempt to accomplish these goals first by cooperating with the existing political parties and eventually by forming their own. The process would be long, controversial and difficult.

Abolitionist & Liberty Party Organization in Indiana

Indiana was slow to develop an organized abolitionist movement. The first county anti-slavery societies in Indiana were not founded until 1836, with a state society coming two years later in 1838. In its infancy, the abolitionist movement in Indiana

²³ Bretz, *The Economic Background of the Liberty Party*, 263.

²⁴ Bretz, 265.

was reliant on and heavily influenced by the anti-slavery press in Ohio. When the Logansport Anti-slavery Society was founded in July of 1836 they requested their proceedings be published in “the anti-slavery papers of the east, together with those papers in this state whose editors are willing to give us a hearing”, but the only paper they mentioned by name was the Cincinnati based *Philanthropist*.²⁵ The Indiana State Anti-Slavery Society also acknowledged their links to the movement in Ohio and resolved that “This Society approves of the spirit and manner in which the PHILANTHROPIST is conducted...we, therefore, adopt it as our OFFICIAL ORGAN, and request all abolitionists to use their exertions to extend its circulation.”²⁶ Furthermore all members pledged to “extend the circulation of the PHILANTHROPIST, and each member pledge himself to obtain at least five new subscribers to that paper.”²⁷

James G. Birney, editor of the *Philanthropist*, led a group of Ohioans who favored political abolitionism and would begin to split with the William Lloyd Garrison led American Anti-Slavery Society in 1839 over the interrelated issues of women’s rights and the political duties of abolitionists. Birney, did not want “to confuse abolitionism with [the] “extraneous” causes such as women’s right and non-resistance” that Garrison championed.²⁸ While abolitionist in Indiana and Ohio favored political abolitionism over such issues, they were not predisposed to the formation of a third party. The *Philanthropist*, declared that

²⁵ Mating Gibson, “A New Society”, *Philanthropist*, Oct 7, 1836, 2. American Periodicals.

²⁶ Donell, “PROCEEDINGS OF THE INDIANA STATE ANTI-SLAVERY CONVENTION”, 2.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸ Stewart, *Holy Warriors*, 91.

abolitionists “never will organize as a political party for the purpose of accomplishing their great desire.”²⁹ Rather than form their own organization abolitionists attempted to work within the two party system and adopted the policy of questioning existing candidates about their positions on slavery, and then voting for whomever would respond satisfactorily. Since publically professing abolitionism was political suicide in Indiana, candidates rarely ever met the abolitionist’s requirements. Nevertheless several factors kept Indiana abolitionists within a two party system.

The Liberty Party formed nationally well before abolitionists in Indiana were ready to form a third party. In 1840 a convention in Albany, New York nominated the Liberty Party candidates for President and Vice-President with no delegates from the Old Northwest in attendance. Despite the population being dominated by delegates from the north-east, James Birney of Ohio was chosen to lead the ticket. Despite the nomination of Birney the Liberty Party received little support from abolitionists in Indiana, or the Ohio based anti-slavery press on which they relied. Gamaliel Bailey, who had by then succeeded Birney as editor of the *Philanthropist*, opposed the formation of a third party based on his own religious reservations and a desire to avoid splitting the abolitionist movement further.³⁰ In Indiana, where “abolitionists were especially unprepared to handle the responsibility of forming a new third party”, the Liberty Party was slow to develop.³¹ The Indiana Anti-Slavery Society, led by Arnold Buffum, and encouraged by the Anti-Slavery Whig

²⁹ Ibid, 28.

³⁰ Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 37-39.

³¹ Ibid, 40.

congressmen James Rariden, voted against the formation of a third party in July of 1840.³² Even those who supported the Liberty Party in the Old Northwest disagreed over their goals, with some aiming only to divorce the federal government from slavery and others actually seeking to abolish slavery in the South.³³

The reluctance of Indiana abolitionists to form or support a third party in 1840 was exacerbated by the popularity of Whig presidential candidate William Henry Harrison was a former Governor of the Indiana Territory and hero of the Battle of Tippecanoe. Even in the few Indiana counties that approved the formation of a third party on their own, the influence of Harrison was disruptive. When the Jefferson County Anti-Slavery Society resolved in September of 1840 to support the nomination of Birney for president, “a spirited discussion ensued... until a late hour. All the argument that could be presented in favor of Gen. Harrison were brought up and well supported.”³⁴ In the end the resolution passed eleven to nine, though Jefferson County only recorded three votes for Birney in 1840. In total, Indiana recorded thirty votes for Birney, far fewer than neighboring Ohio which gave him 1.8% of the vote.³⁵ Abolitionists in Indiana were still trying to work within the two party system, not because it was an effective way of

³² Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 44.

³³ *Ibid.*, 39.

³⁴ James Henderson, “ANTI-SLAVERY MEETING: Carmel Church Jefferson Co. Indiana”, *Philanthropist*, September 22, 1840, 3. American Periodicals.

³⁵ Dorothy Riker, and Gale Thornbrough, *Indiana Election Returns 1816–1851* (Indiana Historical Bureau, 1960) 36.

accomplishing their goals but because Harrison was enormously popular in his home state.

The Liberty Party was not firmly established in Indiana until 1841 and the buildup to the election of 1842. The Indiana Anti-Slavery Society finally endorsed the formation of a third party in February of 1841, reversing the decision it had made to oppose the formation of such a party as recently as July of the previous year.³⁶ Theodore Clarke Smith makes the curious claim that “the true explanation of this change is that abolitionists who favored acting with the old parties no longer attended abolitionist conventions.”³⁷ Smith makes no attempt to explain why partisan abolitionists abruptly ceased attending conventions between July of 1840 and February of 1841. The prominence of the national movement, the death of William Henry Harrison, and mounting frustration with the inability to find anti-slavery candidates within either of the major parties are all more fitting explanations. Still, the transition to a third party was slow. County anti-slavery societies still made resolutions referring only to the duty of abolitionists to fill the halls of legislation with Anti-Slavery politicians without making reference to the Liberty Party even after the State Society had endorsed it.³⁸ Endorsing the Liberty Party was a controversial decision for county anti-slavery societies, and the decision to do so was often accompanied by

³⁶ Reinhard O. Johnson, *The Liberty Party, 1840-1848: Antislavery Third-party Politics in the United States* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009) 211.

³⁷ Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 52.

³⁸ Samuel N. Ustbank, “Nery County Convention” *Protectionist*, April 1, 1841.

“considerable discussion”, which was duly noted when the resolution was published.³⁹

The Liberty Party initially lacked a state wide organization in Indiana and relied largely on County conventions to nominate candidates for local and congressional offices, a task they often struggled with.⁴⁰ In 1841 the Liberty Party nominated Rariden, a former Whig, for Congress, only for him to withdraw at the last minute in order to avoid splitting the vote.⁴¹ The *Protectionist* hastily nominated Daniel Worth, but he was also running for state legislature.⁴² The result was confusion, Rariden still received fourteen votes to Worth’s 102.⁴³ The Liberty Party first organized state wide and attempted a gubernatorial campaign in 1843, nominating Deming and Stephen Harding for Governor and Lieutenant Governor. While Deming and Harding received only 1.4% of the vote statewide, what support they did receive was heavily concentrated in Wayne, Randolph, and Henry counties which accounted for 47% of the Liberty vote.⁴⁴ The town of New Garden, in Wayne County, was a bastion of Liberty Party support which gave the plurality of its votes to Liberty Party Candidates as early as 1841.

³⁹ Jehu Priatt, “Political”, *Protectionist*, June 16 1841, 189.

⁴⁰ Johnson, *The Liberty Party, 1840-1848: Antislavery Third-party Politics in the United States*, 211.

⁴¹ Rariden had lost a campaign for Representative in 1837 because he split the vote with John Finely.

⁴² Arnold Buffum, “Congressional Election” *Protectionist* June 16, 1841, 176.

⁴³ Indiana Election Returns, 105.

⁴⁴ Smith *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 58

The Liberty Party made substantial gains in Indiana heading into the 1844 Election. Though its proportion of the total vote was relatively stagnant, moving from 1.4% of the vote of the 1843 campaign to 1.5%, the increased overall turnout for the election meant that the total number of Liberty Party voters grew substantially.⁴⁵ Again, the vote was concentrated largely in a few eastern counties. Only twelve of Indiana's ninety counties recorded more than fifty Liberty Votes, but these twelve accounted for 70% of the vote within the state.⁴⁶ In New Garden, home of the *Free Labor Advocate*, the Liberty Party presidential ticket received 80% of the total vote.⁴⁷

The increased turnout for the Liberty Party was a result of increasing organization and the acceptance of third party politics by existing abolitionists. In addition, the visit of Henry Clay to Richmond in 1842⁴⁸ had radicalized some local abolitionists, increasing support for third party politics. Though the Liberty Party grew substantially during the 1844 campaign, its growth slowed shortly after, and it began to stagnate. In the 1846 gubernatorial campaign, the Liberty Party received a larger portion of the vote (1.8%) but it added only around 200 votes, a growth of less than 10% and a far cry from the 25% increase in total votes between 1843 and 1844.⁴⁹ New Garden was still majority Liberty Party, but the major parties gained ground and the Liberty Party's percent of the vote declined to 67.9% in

⁴⁵ Johnson, *The Liberty Party, 1840-1848: Antislavery Third-party Politics in the United States*, 212.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 212.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 212.

⁴⁸ The lasting implications of this visit on anti-slavery politics in Indiana will be explored later in this paper

⁴⁹ Smith *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 325.

1845.⁵⁰ After 1846, abolitionists in Indiana began recognizing the decline of their party and began to move back towards working with the existing two party system.

While the Liberty Party in Indiana achieved its greatest successes in 1844 and was powerful at the local level in one or two counties, it was never particularly large or successful. It failed to achieve the abolition of the state's discriminatory black laws and Democrats remained in control of State politics until 1860.⁵¹ In every major election, Indiana still had the fewest total Liberty Party votes of any of the Northwestern states, save sparsely populated Iowa and Wisconsin.⁵² Though it received relatively few votes, what votes it did receive were heavily concentrated in a few counties and townships. What explains the relative weakness of the Liberty Party within the state and the concentration of Liberty Party voters in a few small areas?

Weakness of the Liberty Party in Indiana

The Liberty Party was unsuccessful in Indiana for two main reasons. First, Indiana's population immigrated largely from the South and brought with them favorable attitudes towards that region's "peculiar institution". However, Indiana still had a sizeable population of Quakers that could have formed a substantial anti-slavery movement if not for a schism which drove the majority of Quakers away from Abolitionism. The Liberty Party in Indiana was weak both because there were few

⁵⁰ Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 64.

⁵¹ Johnson, *The Liberty Party, 1840-1848: Antislavery Third-party Politics in the United States*, 215.

⁵² Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 325.

people predisposed to support abolition, and because it lost the support of those few.

The Anti-Slavery movement within Indiana is atypical among anti-slavery movements in the Old-Northwest due to its small size and its position in the mid-eastern rather than northern part of the state. As sectional tension between the Northeast and the South increased, the Northwest, with its rapidly growing population, was positioned to “decide the political balance of the country.” The Old Northwest was populated by settlers from both the Eastern and Southern United states who were often at odds politically, and so the sectional battle between North and South played out within the Old Northwest. In this battle “the institution of slavery and the right of free blacks often became merely another point of contention between rival cultural and religious groups.”⁵³ Supporters of abolitionism were usually migrants from the north-east who settled primarily in the northern portion of the Old-Northwest States. Indiana saw very limited settlement by Northerners who stayed away “due to swamps, bad reputation and land speculators.”⁵⁴ What little support there was for abolitionism in Indiana came primarily from Quakers, many of whom had migrated out of the South and settled in eastern Indiana, primarily in Wayne, Henry, and Randolph Counties.⁵⁵

Indiana Quakers took progressive stances on racial equality but were divided over anti-slavery organization. The Indiana Yearly Meeting had condemned the negrophobic colonization schemes of some anti-slavery groups which they

⁵³ Ibid, 4.

⁵⁴ Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 4.

⁵⁵ Ibid, 12.

termed “the unrighteous work of expatriation”, and issued condemnation of the states racist anti-black laws in 1831.⁵⁶ However, this anti-slavery sentiment did not translate into the creation of anti-slavery organizations. While Ohio had 120 anti-slavery societies with ten thousand members between them by 1836,⁵⁷ Indiana had only eight anti-slavery societies reporting to the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1838.⁵⁸ While some Quaker meetings took anti-slavery stances, the Indiana Yearly Meeting issued statements against the formation of independent anti-slavery societies and “cautioned against joining “with others not of our society” lest the standing of Friends as a “peculiar people” separate from “the world” be compromised.”⁵⁹ Quaker anxieties about forming separate anti-slavery societies were not eased by the fact that Arnold Buffum, who was tasked with establishing these societies in Indiana, had been disowned by eastern Quakers “and had come west pursued by letters and traveling Quaker Ministers warning against him as an infidel and deceiver.”⁶⁰

Quaker opposition to political anti-slavery intensified in 1840 when the leaders of the Indiana Yearly Meeting “issued a statement condemning membership in antislavery societies, and a year later it advised that local meetinghouses be closed to

⁵⁶ Thomas D. Hamm et al., "Moral Choices: Two Indiana Quaker Communities and the Abolitionist Movement." *Indiana Magazine of History* 87 (1991), 119.

⁵⁷ Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 12.

⁵⁸ Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 14.

⁵⁹ Hamm et al., "Moral Choices," 119.

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 120.

antislavery gatherings.”⁶¹ This move was met not with outrage by the *Protectionist*, but with a subdued letter that expressed appreciation for the long history of Quaker anti-slavery and dismay at the closing of the meetinghouses which it claimed were vital instruments for the spread of abolitionism.⁶² Local abolitionists understood the importance of the Yearly Meeting to their cause and seemed to prefer not to push the issue at the time, but this would not last. Increasing tensions between abolitionist and non-abolitionist Friends would ignite over the visit of Henry Clay to Richmond, causing the Indiana Separation of 1842.

On October 1, 1842 soon to be Whig presidential candidate Henry Clay visited Richmond to the great delight of Whig supporters and many prominent Quakers. His visit coincided with the Society of Friends of Indiana Yearly Meeting and Clay was invited to attend by Elijah Coffin, the clerk of the Yearly Meeting. During his visit local abolitionist Hiram Mendenhall delivered a petition with some two thousand signature requesting Henry Clay to manumit his slaves. Clay delivered a stinging rebuttal that was applauded by the gathered crowd and Elijah Coffin informed Clay that the Yearly Meeting did not support the petition.⁶³ Shortly afterwards the Yearly Meeting removed its abolitionist members and declared that no abolitionists could hold leadership positions. Abolitionist friends therefore were separated from the Yearly Meeting and formed their own Indiana Yearly Meeting of Anti-Slavery Friend⁶⁴ This

⁶¹ Ibid, 121.

⁶² Arnold Buffum “Friend” *Protectionist* October 7, 1841.

⁶³ Ryan Jordan, *The Indiana Separation of 1842 and the Limits of Quaker Anti-Slavery*, 1.

⁶⁴ Hamm et al., "Moral Choices," 120.

division alienated a large portion of the demographic that was most likely to support anti-slavery within Indiana and contributed to the weakness of the Liberty Party.

It is difficult to explain why some Quakers took up political abolitionism while others condemned membership in anti-slavery societies. Thomas Drake argues in *Quakers and Slavery in America* that the importance of trade with the South was responsible for the unwillingness of Indiana Quakers to take strong anti-slavery positions.⁶⁵ This explanation was also advanced by contemporary Quakers, who saw the avarice of wealthy Quakers as the explanation for their support of slavery. The *Free Labor Advocate* published a lengthy dialogue between a Quaker merchant and a southern slave-owner in which the slave-owner exposes the hypocrisy of the merchant in selling slave made goods, and the inconsistency of buying slave goods with the Quaker practice of avoiding the purchase of other goods obtained through force, such as prizes from profiteers. Finally, the two discuss the enormous profit margins available on slave made goods, estimating it at 25% and calculating the Quakers profit from cotton alone to be some \$12,500 annually. The dialogue clearly implies that “body” Friends (those who stayed part of the yearly meeting after it expelled the abolitionists in 1842) are hypocrites who undermine the anti-slavery cause due to their lust for profits and their desire to “procure the conveniences, comforts, and necessities of life.”⁶⁶ That Elijah Coffin, clerk of the Yearly Meeting during the separation, was

⁶⁵ Hamm et al., "Moral Choices," 121.

⁶⁶“Dialogue”, *Free Labor Advocate*, August 24, 1844.

himself a storeowner and a banker, would have made it obvious to local Quakers who the attack was targeting.⁶⁷

Though Drake and contemporary Quakers emphasized the role of wealth in determining an individual's positions on abolitionism, a quantitative case study of Indiana Quaker communities at Spiceland and Duck Creek during the 1842 separation brings this theory into question. In this study, Hamm et al concluded that "the decision to become an abolitionist was not a function of wealth or property—economically, Anti-Slavery Friends were a cross section of their communities."⁶⁸ The study similarly discards length of residence in the community and kinship ties as determinative factors, believing that only age and a commitment to the strict observance of Quaker Discipline had significant. Because adherence to discipline was primarily a personal choice and no other sociological characteristics correlate strongly with Anti-Slavery positions, Hamm et al conclude that "decisions about separation are explicable only by individual conscience."⁶⁹

Yet if there is no factor other than individual conscience to explain whether Indiana Quakers chose to support abolitionism, what explains the tendency of Liberty Party voters in Quaker dominated Eastern Indiana to be strongly concentrated in small townships? Within Wayne County "the relatively small townships of New Garden, Perry and Greene accounted for over 70 percent of Wayne's Liberty vote."⁷⁰ This

⁶⁷ Elijah Coffin, *The Life of Elijah Coffin; with a Reminiscence*, (Cincinnati: E. Morgan & Sons, 1863), 22.

⁶⁸ Hamm et al., "Two Quaker Communities," 154.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 154.

⁷⁰ Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest*, 63.

phenomenon was not limited to Indiana, small townships produced the majority of Liberty votes in some areas in Ohio and Michigan.⁷¹ If the decision to support political abolitionism was a private moral choice then why did so many people in these towns make the same choice? Vernon Volpe offers a community based explanation, concluding that “in the Northwest the Liberty Party commitment reflected group loyalty, not simply many acts of individuals.”⁷² Volpe rejects attempts to explain Liberty Party voting as a product of individual interests. The support of entire communities for the Liberty Party meant, as the study of Duckland and Spiceland shows, that its appeal was felt by those of disparate class and social status, not just one group within the community. While individual moral choices may not have been influenced by the ownership of wealth, the public choices of other individuals in a community (and voting was public at this time), strongly influenced individual conscience.

Rather than attempting to characterize the individuals who voted for the Liberty Party we should attempt to characterize the communities in which these individuals were concentrated. New Garden, Perry, and Greene were all smaller, rural communities while Richmond, the county seat and commercial center was important enough to host a presidential candidate. Richmond Quakers would have sacrificed their city’s prestige had they joined with the radical Liberty Party, and as a county seat they had more commercial connections with the South. Peripheral rural communities had less to lose by taking radical anti-slavery position, and could use Liberty voting as a

⁷¹ Ibid, 65.

⁷² Vernon L. Volpe, *Forlorn Hope of Freedom: The Liberty Party in the Old Northwest, 1838-1848*. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1990), 64.

way to make moral critiques of the more prosperous commercial centers.

Though the Liberty Party was a fringe movement everywhere in the United States, its weakness within Indiana is particularly striking. The majority of the population was sympathetic to slavery and only a tenth of the usually staunch anti-slavery Quakers were willing to participate in political abolitionism.⁷³ Though the Liberty Party was a political party that was formed with discrete political goals the weakness of the anti-slavery movement in Indiana combined with the hostility towards abolitionism exhibited by candidates for each of the major parties meant it had no real political power outside of a few county elections. Though it could not influence state politics the Liberty Party still served a prominent role in the lives of its members by allowing them to participate in the political system while still avoiding the taint of slavery.

Freedom from Other Men's Sins

Liberty Men were aware of the weakness of their party and its inability to wield real political power in Indiana. When a wildly optimistic set of calculations emerged projecting exponential Liberty Party growth and its eventual victory, the *Philanthropist* and the *Free Labor Advocate* printed an article refuting these numbers and reminding Liberty men “they must calculate on a hard and protracted battle.”⁷⁴ Despite its political futility, the Liberty Party endured because it accomplished the moral goals of its members by allowing them to participate in the political system without being implicated in the sin of slavery.

⁷³ Hamm et al., “Two Quaker Communities,” 120.

⁷⁴ “Wrong Calculation”, *Free Labor Advocate*, February 23, 1844.

The Liberty Party's goal in preserving the moral purity of its members was central in its rhetoric. The first issue of the *Free Labor Advocate* summarizes its raison d'être thusly;

Believing that this is a subject which should engage the serious attention of all those who desire to escape the guilt of partaking of other men's sins. We propose to establish a periodical, to be entitled the "FREE LABOR ADVOCATE"⁷⁵

Curiously this organ of the Liberty Party does not mention the abolition of slavery in its statement of purpose. Though Henry H. Way, the *Advocate's* editor at the time, is sure to emphasize the papers role in providing moral purity, he alludes only to the "establishment of a correct public sentiment leading to righteous public action" when discussing slavery.⁷⁶ This is in keeping with the positions adopted by the Indiana Liberty party, which denied that the abolition of slavery could be accomplished politically since it was not within the power of congress.

This interpretation of the constitution was an issue of contention for Indiana abolitionists. At the 1838 convention the Indiana Anti-Slavery Society had accepted every declaration of the American Anti-Slavery Society except the one which "concede[d] that congress, under the present national compact, has no right to interfere with any of the slave states, in relation with this momentous subject" which was stricken out. While the Indiana Anti-Slavery Society claimed that congress could abolish slavery in the states, or at least refused to admit that it could not, the Indiana Liberty Party surrendered that power. The Indiana

⁷⁵ Henry H Way, *Free Labor Prospectus*, February 8, 1841.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

State Liberty Convention of 1844⁷⁷ and a Wayne County Liberty Convention in 1843⁷⁸ both included resolutions which denied that congress had any power to abolish slavery in the states. The Liberty Party therefore limited itself to the separation of the federal government from the sin of slavery through the abolition of slavery in the territories, and the prevention of the slave trade in federally owned waters. Both goals were designed to remove northerners from the guilt of slavery, rather than abolish slavery itself.

Voting for the Liberty Party was, therefore, about absolving oneself from sin, rather than accomplishing discrete political goals. When the Liberty Party undermined Whig success in Indiana's fifth district they did not lament the victory of a pro-slavery Democrat, but rather celebrated the unwillingness of abolitionists to be complicit in slavery. The *Protectionist* proclaimed "we regard this however as an encouraging indication, under the circumstances, that abolitionists are no longer solicitous, so to cast their vote for the "least of two evils."⁷⁹ When forced by the National Liberty Party to engage in political pragmatism, the leaders of the Indiana Liberty Party did so with a reluctance approaching on disdain. Benjamin Stanton, when publishing his support for John P. Hale as the party's nominee in 1847, added that he did so "not with any overwhelming desire that he should be nominated" and that there were "many other men whom we could support with equal cheerfulness." Stanton makes it clear that he would much prefer

⁷⁷ "Indiana State Liberty Convention", *Philanthropist*, June 26, 1844, 02. American Periodicals.

⁷⁸ "Liberty Meeting in Indiana", *Philanthropist*, July 19 1843.

⁷⁹ Arnold Buffum, "Congressional Election", *Protectionist* June 16, 1841.

Elihu Burritt, an anti-slavery activist, for the nominee but that “*he is too great and noble a man for the office of President [sic] of the United States. It would be requiring him to descend from his present position to accept of that station.*”⁸⁰ Chase was nominated because he was a member of the U.S. Senate, and therefore a practiced politician with a national stage on which to present the party’s views. To many, a prominent anti-slavery senator would be the ideal choice to lead the Liberty Party. That this nomination was so deeply disliked by Stanton, who favored Burritt, points to the emphasis on religious purification over political pragmatism present in the Liberty Party.

In addition to purifying its members of the national sin of slavery, the Liberty Party and the Anti-Slavery movement in general was also intertwined with various reform movements and an effort to promote public morals and respectability. Henry H. Way pledged that the *Free Labor Advocate* “will tend to elevate and improve the tone of public morals, and increase the aspirations after holiness without which no man can see the Lord.”⁸¹ True to his word, the *Free Labor Advocate* published moral instruction for children, religious themed poetry and warnings against dueling. Stanton’s favorite targets for condemnation were the behavior of Southerners and Henry Clay. He was able to skewer both when he published an anecdote about two Southern girls dueling each other in New Orleans and blamed Clay for encouraging this behavior.⁸² The *Protectionist* for its part, focused far less on the issue of dueling, though it advocated general non-violence, but

⁸⁰ Benjamin Stanton “Mr. Hale’s Nomination”, *Free Labor Advocate*, June 24, 1847.

⁸¹ Henry H. Way, “Free Labor Prospectus”, *Protectionist*, February 8, 1841.

⁸² “Liberty in Vermont”, *Free Labor Advocate*, August 28, 1844.

rather on support for teetotalers and their abstention from alcohol.

The Liberty Party was a political organization with no hope of accomplishing its political objectives. Its main appeal lay not in the promise of political change, but in providing Indiana abolitionists with a way to purify themselves from the sin of slavery. Some historians have seized on this aspect of the Liberty Party, calling it the “school of narrowness” and arguing that the emphasis on political purity precluded political pragmatism and cooperation with other parties. But Liberty Party members eventually did compromise, and when circumstances changed abandoned their “narrow” morally pre-occupied party in support of the more pragmatic and politically oriented Free-Soil Party.

Compromise and Free Soil Fusion

In 1848 the Liberty Party would disband and its abolitionist membership would become part of the Free Soil Party which tolerated slavery in the South but advocated federal prohibitions against the extension of Slavery into newly acquired territories. This dramatic transformation surprised historian Theodore Clarke Smith, who called it a “wonder” that “so few of the faithful refused” to join the Free Soil party.⁸³ Yet if one examines the behavior of the Liberty Party rank-and-file in Indiana from 1836-1838 one finds a remarkable willingness to compromise. The Mexican-American War, the annexation of Texas, and the prospect of the extension of slavery made Liberty Men willing to compromise and gave them common cause with non-abolitionist Northerners in the form of the Wilmot Proviso.

⁸³ Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 145.

Elected in part due to the Liberty Party splitting the Whig vote in New York, President Polk had raised the prospect of expanding slave territory through the conquest of parts of Mexico and the annexation of Texas. In response David Wilmot, a northern Democrat, introduced a rider on a bill appropriating funding for the Mexican-American War. Though this failed, the Wilmot Proviso was taken up by a variety of Northerners who feared the extension of Slavery into new territory would produce a power imbalance between the North and the South. Liberty men became fearful that slavery would be extended and were willing to compromise and give up abolition in favor of non-extension. The Mexican American War moderated Indiana abolitionists so that they were willing to be politically pragmatic, but also gave them an issue around which a larger coalition could be formed.

Indiana Liberty Men did not immediately seek to form a new political organization, but rather returned to their earlier tactic of questioning existing candidates and withdrawing if they were willing to support non-extension. In Indiana's fifth district the Liberty Party sent a letter to both the Whig and Democratic candidate, asking if they would vote to allow a new slave state (i.e. annex Texas), oppose all territorial acquisition unless it is the purchase of free territory (approve the Wilmot Proviso), vote for immediate peace with Mexico, and refuse to vote for a slaveholder for President. The Democratic candidate, Judge Wick only claimed to technically be in agreement with the second by claiming that territory acquired from Mexico was not conquest but rather "an atonement for debts justly due."⁸⁴ The Whig candidate, Mr. McCarty, agreed on the Wilmot Proviso and peace

⁸⁴ Wick, William. "Judge Wick's Letter" *Indiana State Sentinel*, July 15, 1847.

with Mexico, but disagreed over the annexation of Texas and voting for a slave holding president.⁸⁵ Despite McCarty only agreeing to half of their proposals, the Liberty Party candidate, Mr DePuy, bowed out because:

"Those who desired that the abolitionists should support Mr. McCarty, in order to have the district represented by a Wilmot Proviso Man would vote for him if I should continue to be a candidate ... Those who are not willing to vote for Mr. McCarty can still vote for some well-known abolitionist and I shall be saved the extreme mortification of being the nominee of a party, a large portion of whose votes will be given to another man."⁸⁶

This was not the only instance of Liberty Party members abandoning abolition and their party for non-extension and political viability. In July of 1847, Liberty Party Candidate T.R. Stanford withdrew his candidacy in favor of allowing Whig Candidate C.B. Smith to run instead because Smith would "oppose the annexation of any territory to the United States, without a provision prohibiting *Slavery* therein."⁸⁷ On the 29th of June in 1847 another Liberty Convention decided that, rather than nominate an independent candidate, they would question the Whig and Democratic candidates and if these candidates

⁸⁵ "Mr. McCarty's Letter to the Abolition Committee" *Indiana State Sentinel*, June 30, 1847.

⁸⁶ *Indiana State Sentinel*, July 15, 1847.

⁸⁷ T.R. Stanford, "Communication", *Free Labor Advocate*, July 1, 1847.

answered satisfactorily on the issue of non-extension, the Liberty Convention would throw their support behind them.⁸⁸

This shift towards accepting non-extension over abolition was greeted with outrage by Benjamin Stanton, editor of the *Free Labor Advocate*, who called it “a great blunder.” Stanton accused the Liberty Men in Indianapolis who supported McCarty of having “given up the idea of maintaining their distinctive Principles.”⁸⁹ Some Liberty Men in Indianapolis seemed to agree with Stanton, and so Stanford’s replacement as Liberty Party Candidate, Levi Bowman, still received 163 votes. While there was willingness to compromise and an attempt to find common ground in non-extension in 1847, some still clung to the abolition oriented Liberty Party.

National events would change this by creating the possibility of a broader third party based on the principle of non-extension. In New York the Democrats split over factional grievances and Democratic candidate Lewis Cass’s stance on the Wilmot Proviso. This withdrawal was mirrored by portions of the Democratic Party in the Northwestern states.⁹⁰ The Whig nomination of General Taylor and his unwillingness to take a stance in favor of the Wilmot Proviso produced similar outrage among anti-slavery Whigs. A national Free Soil Convention was called in Buffalo to form a new party based on the non-extension of slavery. The convention was dominated by former Democrats who made a deal with prominent Liberty men. The Convention would nominate Van Buren, a Democrat, in exchange for a platform which made it the Federal government’s duty to abolish

⁸⁸ Benjamin Stanton, “Congressional, *Free Labor Advocate*, July 7th 1847.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*

⁹⁰ Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 124.

slavery where it was able, meaning the territories and the District of Colombia.⁹¹

Indiana Liberty party leaders S.C. Stevens and S. Harding made the decision to endorse a merger with the Free Soil Party, and the Indiana Free Soil Party met in Indianapolis in August to nominate a state ticket.⁹² Benjamin Stanton, who previously had condemned compromise and the adoption of non-extension, converted to the Free Soil Party after the Buffalo convention. Historian Vernon Volpe has explained Stanton's conversion through his correspondence with Free Soil leader Salmon P. Chase and emphasized Stanton's role in bringing the Liberty Party in Indiana into the Free Soil movement. However, Stanton's stature in the movement had declined by 1847-8. He had been struggling to publish the *Free Labor Advocate* due both to personal illness and a dwindling number of subscribers.⁹³ His abrupt conversion from condemning non-extension to an embrace of the Free Soil party following the Buffalo Convention can be explained by both the personal diplomacy of Salmon P. Chase, and his own exhaustion and poor health. A sick and aged Stanton likely found it easier to accept the transition to Free Soil rather than persist in the dwindling Liberty Party.

Liberty Men largely supported the Free Soil Party in the 1848 elections. However, state elections in Indiana occurred in August, only a few months after the Liberty and Free Soil parties had fused, so there was not time to have conventions and nominate candidates in every county. In the confusion the Free Soil label was claimed by Whig and Democratic candidates who

⁹¹ Ibid, 140.

⁹² Ibid, 140.

⁹³ Benjamin Stanton, "My Health and Prospects", *Free Labor Advocate*, April 21, 1848.

advocated non-extension.⁹⁴ George Evans, a democrat, was elected to the State Senate in traditionally Whig Union County by becoming a Free Soil supporter. In the same county the Whig representative for the Indiana general assembly, Dr. G.C. Starbuck, also declared his support for the Liberty Party and won. In the Quaker dominated Fourth District, the Free Soil Party was able to elect George W. Julian to Congress as part of a contentious campaign which Julian described by saying the “worst passions of humanity were set on fire among the Whigs.”⁹⁵ While Van Buren received only 5% of the vote in Indiana and failed to carry a single state nationally, the Free Soil movement won more local elections than the Liberty Party ever did.⁹⁶

After the 1848 election, the Free Soil Party declined, and by 1850 had suffered major losses due to the willingness of Indiana Whigs and Democrats to take up non-extension without joining a third party.⁹⁷ That year the only Free Soil Candidate elected was Isaac Kinley from Henry County, and few remained in the movement besides die-hard liberty followers.⁹⁸ The Compromise of 1850 briefly revived the Free Soil Party in Indiana for the 1851 Campaign. In 1854 Indiana joined the Anti-Nebraska movement that would become the Republican Party, but Free Soil men played a distinctly minor role in comparison with Whigs in both the formation of the Anti-Nebraska

⁹⁴ Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 157.

⁹⁵ Julian, *Political Recollections*, 66.

⁹⁶ Johnson, *The Liberty Party, 1840-1848: Antislavery Third-party Politics in the United States*, 214.

⁹⁷ Johnson, 215.

⁹⁸ Smith, *The Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Old Northwest*, 193.

movement and the governing of the control of the Republican Party parties.

Conclusion

The Liberty Party in Indiana must be understood as a product of both the religious ideals of its members and the political circumstances in which it was formed. Its members were deeply concerned with their own personal piety, but they also had clear political goals that the demographic composition of their state made unachievable. The overwhelming focus of the Liberty Party in Indiana on liberating its members from other men's sins should be understood as a response to, as well as a cause of, the Party's political ineffectiveness. The Liberty Party's decision to fuse with the Free Soil movement is not as "miraculous" or unprecedented as has previously been suggested once the overwhelming religiosity of the Liberty Party is explained as a product of political circumstance. After the Mexican American War created the possibility of a broader coalition, Liberty Party members actively worked to build alliances with Whig and Democratic supporters of the Wilmot Proviso in places where the Liberty Party was weak (Indianapolis) and where it was relatively strong (Union County). Far from being uncompromising religious zealots, Liberty Men in Indiana took the opportunity to join a more politically powerful organization even when it compromised their moral stand against slavery.

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Science, Technology, and Japanese Nationalism

BY JOEY SLUCHER

Today, Japan is a technological powerhouse, home to companies such as Sony, Toshiba, and Fujitsu. However, Japan did not develop into a world leader in technology until its total defeat in World War II. After Japan unconditionally surrendered, the Japanese lost their sense of national pride and identity.¹ Before their defeat, the people believed that Japan was the leading country in Asia, and that they were considerably more powerful than any other Asian country. After defeat, however, this belief was not as common. The lack of technological prowess during the war period was obvious to the Japanese people with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But not long after, Japan was once again filled with national pride. Instead of this pride being focused on military conquest, it was channeled through views of peaceful technology. Technology became the new source of national pride and identity in the wake of total defeat and devastation. How and why did this become the mechanism through which Japanese people could regain national pride and identity? Japanese high-tech manufacturing has become one of the largest and most competitive markets in the world, of which Japan is proud. This development was in part due to government policy, reconstruction of social ideology, economic recovery, and consumer culture in post-war Japan. Japan regained national pride after World War II through becoming a competitive

¹Kenkichi Koizumi, "In Search of 'Wakon': The Cultural Dynamics of the Rise of Manufacturing Technology in Postwar Japan." *Technology and Culture* 43, no. 1 (2002), 40.

technology power house that identifies itself with moving forward.

Technology and Science before World War II

The history of technology in pre-war Japan before the black ships of Admiral Perry was focused on importing military technology. During the Edo period, while Japan was mostly secluded from the west, some technology, such as guns, was imported.² Although, unlike the post-war, the technologies imported were not being improved in Japan. This shows that the post-war advancement of technologies is not a long-standing historical tradition. Japan did not start improving imported technologies until the Imperial period. Real success improving technologies occurred, to a much lesser degree, in World War II and in the post-war period. Therefore, the manufacturing technology boom was new during the war period.

Pride and interest in technology in Japan was not a new phenomenon in the post-war years. In the beginning of the Meiji era, the Meiji leaders saw the importance of technology in the process of modernization and sent missions to western countries to learn from them.³ The entire Meiji Restoration was triggered by a more technologically powerful force driving Japan out of seclusion. After the attack on Pearl Harbor, many Japanese people believed the attack to be a great success and were proud of their aircraft technology.⁴ And while the main source of pride was in the supposed bravery of the military for attacking such a

² Koizumi, 33.

³ Mikiso Hane, *Japan: A Short History* (Revised Edition edition. Oneworld Publications, 2013), 86.

⁴ Koizumi, 40.

large powerful country, the people still believed the fighter planes played a large role. While these experiences are limited, they show a few things. One, the government of Japan, ever since the Meiji era, actively sought out technology for the national defense and war capabilities of Japan.⁵ Two, pride in technology was present before the post-war technology boom, embedded within the framework of imperialistic-nationalism. It was not until the post-war period, however, that Japan could say it became a world leader in technology development. During the Meiji and Showa eras, Japan wanted to build a “rich nation, and strong army.” This slogan became the foundation for technological development in pre-war Japan and guaranteed that the priority of development be on military applications.⁶ It was not until after the war, however, that technological development was restricted to the civilian sector and therefore more closely tied to everyday Japanese people.

Occupation

After Japan’s unconditional surrender in World War II, many citizens linked the defeat to the backwardness of technology and science in Japan. Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro encouraged the people of Japan to build a new national identity and work towards better technology, which he considered

⁵ Richards J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan*. (Cornell University Press. 1996), 33.

⁶ Samuels, 42.

Japan's greatest deficiency in the war.⁷ Intellectuals at the time encouraged Japan to build a new national spirit linked to technology. In the immediate post-war period the state-led nationalism was abandoned and the Japanese identity was lost. The void left by defeat in the war led to an abandonment of the state-led nationalism and the rise of nationalism through technology and science.⁸ Furthermore, the defeat compared Japanese technology to American technology, culminating in the dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the technological powerhouse, America.

Many Japanese believed the victory of the United States to be a victory of its technology over Japanese spirit, meaning they believed that a war could not be won with spirit alone. Even though they were defeated by a coalition of countries, including ones from Asia with inferior technology, Japan still saw the United States as the only victor because they would have learned a different set of lessons if they did not.⁹ Japan did not face up to its war past, instead both the United States and Japan saw it easier to look towards the future, as shown by not trying Emperor Hirohito for his part in the war. In this future, technology and science was seen as a way to rebuild and repair Japan's economy. As Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro claimed, people blamed their defeat on inferior technology, Japan saw the weakness in their previous war identity in technology and not the atrocities committed in the name of Japan. This set up the perfect environment for technological improvement and

⁷ Morris Low, "Displaying the Future: Techno-Nationalism and the Rise of the Consumer in Postwar Japan." *History & Technology* 19, no. 3, (2003), 200.

⁸ Low, 197.

⁹ Low, 200.

nationalism, emerging from that improvement, soon after the war.

Yukawa Hideki, a theoretical physicist and the Japanese Nobel Laureate inspired many Japanese people and helped them get through the sobering defeat. Meijio University Professor Akasaki Isamu, who also received a Nobel Prize in physics, stated in a recent interview that in an “era marked by defeat in the war,” Yukawa winning the Nobel Prize helped him “get better.”¹⁰ In the same news article, *The Japan News* claimed Yukawa “carried the heavy of expectations of a nation defeated by war on his shoulders.” Yukawa not only inspired many people to go into the field of physics, he also attracted international attention to Japan. Only four years after the war, people were still searching for a new national pride. Yukawa’s Nobel Prize gave the Japanese people something to be proud of. This was a Japanese physicist, who was able to keep up with the West in physics with his research. He inspired many Japanese people with his award, and helped pave the way for technology as part of the Japanese national pride.

Trains and National Pride

Japan’s national pride in technology has had a very close relation to the development of trains. In the post-war years Japan became the first country to implement a national rail system that uses only all-steel train cars. After the war, the Japanese people were freer to insert themselves into the system and have their voices heard. During the occupation people began to criticize the

¹⁰ “Hideki Yukawa: The Man That Inspired a Nation.” *The Japan News*. Accessed April 26, 2015. <http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002059447>.

trains of Japan and their wooden design as being very dangerous to the lives of Japanese citizens. The trains were so dangerous that many accidents occurred that left hundreds of people injured or dead. After one incident *The Daily Yomiuri* claimed that this “murderous train shames our Japanese population” and that these problems “exist nowhere else in the world.”¹¹ Ordinary citizens involved themselves in the decision making processes and pushed for better trains, leading to Japan adopting all-steel car trains.¹² The shame from dangerous trains was linked to the Japanese identity. Wartime engineers joined railway companies and, using their wartime experience, developed lighter, safer cars.¹³ This shows that in the shame of defeat, Japan heavily criticized its own science and technology. This example of developing and implementing the all-steel car demonstrates that this shame brought about the desire to improve, and in this the identity of the Japanese people was linked to technology.

The Development of the *shinkansen*, or bullet train, was steeped in nationalistic sentiment. Japanese National Railways (JNR) supported the development of the *shinkansen* with nationalistic overtones and established the “High-Speed Rail Study Club.”¹⁴ It is no coincidence that the Tokaido bullet train was launched before the opening of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964. Japan wanted to proudly show the new technology to the world, and there was no better time to do so than the 1964 Olympics. The games gave Japan the opportunity to show off

¹¹ *The Daily Yomiuri*, 23 December 1945.

¹² Takeshi Nishiyama, “War, Peace, and Nonweapons Technology: The Japanese National Railways and Products of Defeat, 1880s-1950s.” *Technology and Culture* 48, no. 2 (April 1, 2007), 295.

¹³ Nishiyama, 298.

¹⁴ Nishiyama, 193.

new train technology to boost their own moral as a global technology provider. Later in the 1970s, Fukunaga Kenji declared in a diet session that “Japan is advancing far ahead of Western nations, which keep watch on our linear motor technology.”¹⁵ He also stated that “I believe Japan will lead the technology as absolutely the best in the field, the Japanese races needs to demonstrate its latent strength as this national project grows.” This is one example of the nationalistic rhetoric was used in the development of the *shinkansen* in the 1960s and 70s. The development of the *shinkansen* was seen by many as Japan passing western technologies and therefore western countries themselves. Using nationalistic rhetoric became the tactic to gain funding, but it also caused the *shinkansen* to become a national project with which people could align themselves. Many politicians supported the funding of the *shinkansen* by integrating Japanese national identity with the development of the *shinkansen*. By developing the linear motor technology Japanese people were displaying their strength as a nation. This type of rhetoric clearly shows how manufacturing technology became a part of Japanese identity and national pride during the post-war years.

In 1981, French engineers successfully established a new high-speed world record. At the time, this caused many in Japan to respond with nationalistic encouragement to regain the title. Countless people voiced their concern and claimed that the *shinkansen* is no longer the world’s best train.¹⁶ Nationalists called for Japan to catch up and surpass the West once again, similar to the pre-war sentiment. Train technology was wrapped into Japanese identity. Therefore, when the French engineers produced a faster train, politicians and engineers framed the

¹⁵ Nishiyama, 193.

¹⁶ Nishiyama, 195.

Japanese identity as inferior to the West. In response, these groups increased the amount of nationalistic rhetoric they used. This indicates the role technology played in the Japanese identity after World War II. The rhetoric used by politicians incorporated elements of nationalism and technology. Technology, and in this specific case, train technology, became focal points of pride for post-war Japan. The imperialistic state-led nationalism that existed before the war was replaced by pride in peaceful technology.

The Japanese Government's Role in Nationalism through Technology

The immediate post-war economy of Japan was in shambles and in need of serious reform. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw technology as important for the Japanese economy given Japan's lack of natural resources.¹⁷ From this, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs talked about how the only way for Japan's economy to be sustainable was through developing and exporting advance technology. Also, they aimed to maintain an edge on technology so that Japan could stay competitive in the world market. The Japanese government clearly showed their support for Japan becoming a technological power house in their planning of the economy. This government support was very important for Japan to develop national pride through technology. It nurtured a competitive spirit that would later become very prevalent in the development of faster *shinkansen*.

¹⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 'Economic Stabilization and Reconstruction' *Sources of Japanese Tradition, Abridged: Part 2: 1868 to 2000*. Edited by W.M. Theodore de Bary. et. Al. Abridged 2nd edition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 357.

This shows that early into the post-war years the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was fostering the national pride from manufacturing technology that Japan would have just several decades after total defeat. In the goal of developing exportable goods through technology advancement came a national focus that became a part of the Japanese identity and therefore Japanese nationalism.

The Japanese government has focused on technological development and followed through on making Japanese technology competitive in the Global Markets for exportation. In 1969, the government began planning to close the gap on computer technology with the United States.¹⁸ While Japan was beginning to catch up to the United States in computer technology the government helped fund this endeavor to hasten its success. In 2005, the government planned 10-year “national goals” to strengthen Japanese competition in the global markets.¹⁹ Some of the fields focused on were biotechnology and nanotechnology, fields in which Japan competes with the United States and Europe. What both the 1969 and 2005 case have in common is the competition between Japan and other countries. The government is still dedicated to securing Japan’s place as a technology powerhouse and promoting competition between

¹⁸ Stuart Griffin, “Letter from Tokyo: Computers and the Gap.” *Science News* 95, no. 9 (March 1, 1969), 222.

¹⁹ “Govt Sets 10 Technology Goals Development in Critical Areas Aims to Strengthen Competitiveness.” *The Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo)*, January 9, 2005.
<http://www.lexisnexis.com/lncui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=4F6M-SJW0-0 01X-J1WW&csi=145202&chl=t&chv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true>.

Japan and other countries. While at first the goal was to catch up to the west, the goal now is to stay competitive. The government has allowed for nationalism through technology and science to flourish through the funding of research. The rhetoric used for getting support for these plans often uses phrases such as “national goals,” which helps to reaffirm technology as an essential part of Japanese pride, identity, and nationalism

Consumerism’s Role in Nationalism through Technology

In the immediate post-war period, much of the national focus was on rebuilding Japan, devastated by American bombings. Something that astonished many Japanese people, during this time, was how much material wealth America had.²⁰ In his article “In Search of ‘Wakon’: The Cultural Dynamics of the Rise of Manufacturing Technology in Postwar Japan,” Kenkichi Koizumi argues that this is the reason manufacturing technology became a focus of Japan and apart of Japan’s national pride. In the post-war vacuum created by the loss of national pride and spirit, the focus on material wealth led to a focus on creating not only things Japanese people needed and wanted but also that the world wanted. Survival of Japan focused on exporting goods as shown by the Japanese Government’s plans for the economy. This meshed with the search for a new Japanese identity and pride. In order for Japan to survive, it had to import food and the other products it needed and, develop its industries and export cheap good-quality products. The American model of consumerism gave Japanese people something to strive for and therefore the development of

²⁰ Koizumi, 41.

technology became incredibly important for Japan's survival and merged with the Japanese identity.

After World War II, Japan could no longer produce military technology and became a country focused on economic development through consumerism. Technological development was concentrated in the civilian sector. The national goals of Japan went from "Rich nation, strong army" to just "rich nation."²¹ In the mid-1950s household electric appliances, such as television, washing machines, and refrigerators grew in popularity. This consumer boom in Japan forced manufacturers to develop new products that could compete first on a domestic market and eventually on the global market. The new consumer-oriented Japan turned owning things like home appliances from something reserved for affluent people to a part of the overall culture. This signified the importance of developing newer and better technology for the consumers of Japan. Not only did consumerism become a part of the national identity, it also drove development of new technologies for the domestic and global market. Development, likewise, nurtured technology becoming a part of the Japanese national identity. Because domestic markets wanted newer and better technology, these technologies that were made for Japanese people could be sold in the global market, giving the people of Japan a source of national pride.

Consumerism also played an important role in nationalism through technology in television commercials and other advertisements. By 1960, Sony said in a TV advertisement that its portable TV was another reason for Japan to be proud of itself.²² Another example, as seen in Figure 1, is a Sony tape recorder magazine advertisement that was released in 1954.

²¹ Low, 203.

²² Low, 203.

The top of the advertisement reads *Nihon no unda sekai no marku* which translates to “Japan’s mark on the world.”²³ The phrase is another example of how advertisements played into the nationalism through technology present in post-war Japan. This


日本の生んだ世界のマーク

SONY

スーツケースの
気軽さです……

トランジスタを使った、ご家庭向の
テープコーダー101型……大き
さも一段と小さくなり、手軽に持ち運
びができます。しかも、小型ながら
大きい7型のテープがか、りますの
で最大2時間は録音できます。歌や
踊りの練習、語学の勉強、音楽鑑賞、
8ミリのトーキーなどに最適です。

ソニー株式会社 東京都品川区大崎局 私書函9号 ・カタログ呈



ご家庭用101型
¥29,800. (付属品一式共)

外形寸法 (33×27×17.5センチ)



Figure 1. A Sony magazine advertisement for a tape recorder that was published in 1954. The top of the advertisement reads “Japan’s mark of the world.”

signified the rise of nationalism through technology in Japan.

²³ “*Mukashi no kouku*” (Old Advertisements), Yahoo Japan, (accessed May, 4, 2015)
<http://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/kemukemu23611/folder/1534423.html?m=1c&p=7>

Right after World War II, Japanese people felt they did not have anything to be proud of. These TV and magazines advertisements, which came only 15 years after the war, show how technology already fueled nationalism and identity by 1960. Japanese manufacturers repeatedly declared that Japan was gaining international attention from its advancements. Japan's electronics and appliances were continuously linked to Japanese culture, which gave Japan its technological strength. It did not matter that many of these technologies were not technically created by Japan but actually imported and then improved. After the products entered Japan, they became Japanese and the improvements made to them gave the Japanese people something to be proud of.

Conclusion

On November 20th, 2012, Shintaro Ishihara, a very nationalistic and conservative politician spoke at the Foreign Correspondents Club. In this talk he emphasized Japan's role in military technology. For example, he claimed that "when you look at a U.S. military plane cockpit now, all the parts are made in Japan" and that because Japan "made a decision to provide technological support" to the United States during the Gulf War" the United States was "able to win this conflict easily."²⁴ While Ishihara is an extreme conservative, this shows another shift in technology, science, and nationalism in Japan. Now in Japan, with the recent reinterpretation of Article 9, technology

²⁴ Shintaro Ishihara at the Foreign Correspondents' Club," 2012. video clip, accessed May 5, 2015, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdAo-ozkSzk&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

development might once again enter the military sector and be developed for national security. Ishihara, who at one point was the governor of Tokyo, showed his support for Japan to start developing technology for military applications. During this conference, Ishihara also stated that “Japan has developed tremendous technologies of its own.” He promoted nationalism through technology and even has distrust for other countries technological and scientific advancements. He also stated that he distrusted American genetically modified food (GMO).²⁵ Throughout this talk, Ishihara praised Japanese technology and dismissed other countries’ technologies by either outright saying he did not trust them or claiming that Japan has greatly helped them. As Article 9 is debated, the role of technology will be debated as well. Therefore, the nationalism of technology as it is in Japan is being reshaped for the contemporary context.

²⁵ Shintaro Ishihara at the Foreign Correspondents’ Club,” 2012. video clip, accessed May 5, 2015, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdAo-ozkSzk&feature=youtube_gdata_player.

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[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdAo-
ozkSzk&feature=youtube_gdata_player](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wdAo-ozkSzk&feature=youtube_gdata_player).

The Marian Court in Context: Mary Tudor's Court as Part of the Tudor Legacy

BY EMMA VROOM

I.

Fitting Mary Tudor back into the context of a Tudor ruler is a complicated matter. As the first Queen regnant of England she was required to find a balance between her role as a woman and her role as a monarch, something that no English monarch before her had needed to do. Despite the major shift in court politics and court life in general that her reign marked, she is often ignored because of her sister Elizabeth's popularity. Instead of being seen as an important part of the Tudor legacy, she has been consistently removed from her environment and looked at as an anomaly, an aberration, or a blip in the story of early modern England. Her legacy, from the time of John Foxe's 1563 *Acts and Monuments*, has been that of a cruel, foolish woman. She was written off as too easily swayed by bad men or too committed to her own plan of Catholic restoration to be able to rule properly or even attempt to do so.

The reality of Mary's reign is so often overshadowed by the myth of it that there has been considerably less research done on her relationship to her court and advisors than of other Tudor rulers and courts. Despite the lack of research, there are a significant number of sources that provide insight into Mary's relationship to her court and advisors and which make it more clear what her role in the politics of her court was. When historians look at Mary Tudor's Privy Council and advisors, they tend to focus on who was at fault for the perceived mistakes that took place during her reign. The mistakes that have shaped her

image range from her marriage to Philip II of Spain to the executions of Protestants for which she is known.

The purpose of this paper is not to place blame, nor is it to look at who had the most influence over the actions of Mary Tudor. Instead, it aims to look at how Mary related to her council and advisors and how this fits into the context of Tudor court life and court politics. It will also explore how Mary's gender changed the way she acted as a monarch in general, as well as how she participated in court politics and ran her court in particular. Her sister Elizabeth is often seen as the monarch worth studying in terms of the intersection of gender and politics in Tudor England. While this is not untrue, Mary Tudor was the first Tudor monarch to navigate the intersection of gender and court politics; her situation was very different from Elizabeth's and certainly worthy of its own research and exploration. As the first female monarch of England, Mary essentially paved the way for all female monarchs to follow, even if they did not necessarily interact with their political courts in the same way she had. Yet the importance of her relationship with her court is rarely acknowledged and the impact her gender had on this relationship even less so. Exploring how Mary's court fits into the Tudor context and how her gender influenced her relationship with her court will show that the Marian Court was neither a duplicate of other Tudor courts, nor was it totally new or unrecognizable. In order to do so it is necessary to explore the relationships between Mary and two of her most important advisors, Simon Renard and Reginald Pole.

This paper will therefore look at ideas about court life and politics, as well as primary sources directly relating to court politics and advising in order to show the ways in which Mary's interactions with her court and court politicians were both altered by her gender and religion yet still in line with other

Tudor rulers in many ways. Specifically, it will focus on the calendars of state papers of Spain and Venice to see how advisors and councilors were communicating with Mary and with their higher-ups and how she viewed her own role in terms of court politics and decision making. Before exploring primary sources it is necessary to situate this paper in a historiographical sense.

The three themes of Tudor court politics that are especially pervasive in historians' research on court studies are the Privy Chamber, factionalism, and the "strong king". In her historiographical review of Tudor politics, Natalie Mears points out that the study of the Marian court and its politics is inherently different than that of the courts that came before it. The focus in the study of the Marian Court is generally on Mary's Privy Council and the group of councilors her husband chose to try and help guide her.¹ In the past, historians of Tudor courts tended to focus on institutions such as the Privy Council or Parliament. Geoffrey Elton, the leading proponent of this idea, believed that the lack of military, legal, and financial power in the members of the Privy Chamber, the people who lived and worked with the monarch on a daily basis and helped them with regular life, placed them below members of established governmental institutions in terms of influence.² The role of members of the Privy Chamber was not as overtly political or governmental as the role of members of the Privy Council because their job was not to help run a government, but to help a monarch with the regular activities of daily life. However, many historians since Elton have asserted the importance of the Privy

¹ Natalie Mears, "Courts, Courtiers, and Culture in Tudor England," *The Historical Journal* 46, no. 3 (2003), 708.

² *Ibid*, 707.

Chamber as a center of influence and the court as a major center of political proceedings. In Tudor courts prior to Mary's accession, the Privy Chamber had been an important political sphere, with those courtiers who were able to gain positions in the Monarch's personal quarters also gaining direct access to the monarch.

Because of her gender, Mary Tudor's Privy Chamber has not been seen as particularly important to her political decision-making. Mary's Privy Chamber was almost entirely restricted to women. As David Loades points out, some of these women, such as Susan Clarencius, had "been with Mary for years and were very close to her."³ The women of the Privy Chamber were thought by those at court to use their influence to gain things for themselves, but when it came to influencing the Queen, specifically on the matter of marriage, they surprisingly went with her inclination.⁴ Their political pull was lessened by the fact that very few of the ladies of the Privy Chamber were wives of Privy Council members, the people whose job it was to influence and help the monarch make political decisions.⁵ Even with the little influence they may have had within the Privy Chamber due to their spending large amounts of time with the Queen, women other than Mary could not cross over from the private to the political sphere in the ways that men could. A man in a male monarch's Privy Chamber could have had some authority outside

³ D.M. Loades, *The Reign of Mary Tudor: Politics, Government and Religion in England 1553-58* (Routledge, 2014), 43.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ D.M. Loades, *Intrigue and Treason: The Tudor Court, 1547-1558* (Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson, 2004), 133.

of the monarch's chambers and private life because of his gender, but a woman could not.

Compared to the role of the Privy Chamber, factionalism versus the "strong king" is an issue that is more applicable to the Marian court. Because there is less historical work on the Marian court, it is important to look at the courts that came before Mary's. In his 1995 article, "The Structures of Politics in Early Tudor England", Steven Gunn explores the debate between historians over whether or not Henry VIII was a "strong king" who controlled the government and decided what to do on his own, or whether he was influenced by factions at court. He focuses on where these ideas come from, ultimately declaring that both sides have valid and convincing evidence.⁶ In another article published in 1992, Robert Shephard also emphasizes the importance of factions in the study of court politics.⁷ In 2004, David Loades, one of the preeminent historians of the Tudor period, published his book *Intrigue and Treason: The Tudor Court 1547-1558*. One of the few books that looks specifically at the Marian and Edwardian courts, it argues that the Marian court was not defined by faction in the way that other Tudor courts had been, and even goes so far as to say there was no faction in the Marian court at all.⁸

Perceptions of Mary's authority and power have been evolving for centuries. J.A. Froude, a prominent English historian writing in the mid-19th century, was biased because of

⁶ Steven Gunn, "The Structures of Politics in Early Tudor England," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Sixth Series, 5 (1995), 59, 90.

⁷ Shephard, Robert. "Court Factions In Early Modern England." *The Journal of Modern History* 64, no. 4, 92.

⁸ Loades, *Intrigue and Treason*, 294.

his own Protestant beliefs, and continued the Protestant trend of writing Mary Tudor as less than capable, although he differed from earlier Protestant historians in that he did not write her as particularly malicious. However, his ideas took hold and remained prevalent for decades, perhaps even as long as a century. Since Froude's depiction in the 1850s, there has been a slow and steady move towards acknowledging Mary's greater control of her reign and political decisions. Historians working in the first half of the 20th century saw her as having significantly more authority than Froude did, but still felt she was manipulated by her advisors and husband.⁹ After centuries of debate, there is still no consensus over who is to blame for the persecutions of the Marian restoration, but historians have generally come to the conclusion that Mary was a stronger ruler and had more sway in her own court than previously believed. This is certainly true for historian Anna Whitelock in her biography of the Queen, which presents a ruler who was much stronger than Froude or even H.F.M Prescott, writing in the 1950's, would have considered.¹⁰

New ideas about gender have also shaped recent studies. Historians are certainly in agreement that as the first Queen Regnant of England, Mary Tudor's court and relationship to her court was very different from her predecessors'. What is less sure is how exactly her contemporaries felt about her gender and how they applied gendered ideas to her reign and power. In her article, "Mary Tudor as 'Sole Quene?': Gendering Tudor Monarchy", Judith M. Richards argues that Mary's gender was

⁹ James Anthony Froude and Eamon Duffy, *The Reign of Mary Tudor* (London: Continuum, 2009).

¹⁰ Anna Whitelock, *Mary Tudor: Princess, Bastard, Queen*, (New York: Random House, 2009).

extremely important, as signified by the creation of legislation that further solidified her position as monarch, which was created even after her coronation. Mary was coming to the throne not only as the first female ruler of England, but as a monarch who had been previously declared a bastard, making this legislation a precaution but not a necessity. Mary's gender was even more important when she became a wife. Richards sees the social and legal subservience of wives to husbands in England as greatly problematic for Mary.¹¹ Cynthia Herrup's article – published nine years after Richards' – entitled "The King's Two Genders", takes even further the idea that while Mary's gender was an issue, it was not a simple matter of people thinking a queen could not rule on her own. She argues, "That contemporaries preferred to be ruled by an adult male is incontrovertible, yet we may have painted the disabilities of female kings in darker colors than are appropriate."¹² Herrup's article focuses on the fact that a king, male or female, was expected to have both feminine and masculine qualities, so no matter the gender of the king, they would not be lacking in some areas and better in others.¹³ She does not argue that female kings were in any way more desirable than male kings but that a female

¹¹ Judith M. Richards, "Mary Tudor As 'Sole Quene?': Gendering Tudor Monarchy," *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 4 (1997): 903, 908.

¹² Cynthia Herrup, "The King's Two Genders." *Journal of British Studies* 45, no. 3 (2006).

¹³ Herrup chooses to use the title of "king" for both male and female monarchs. In this way she emphasizes the separation between the monarch as ruler and political figure from the person who fills the role of monarch.

monarch was more complicated than may have been previously imagined. While male kings could in some ways balance out their overly masculine traits with a wife, it was more difficult for a female king to do the opposite. Even so, not all feminine traits were inherently negative and not all masculine traits were inherently positive in a king.¹⁴ The general discussion on the role that Mary's gender played in her status as Queen of England has become, over the last few decades, much more complex. Being a female ruler is no longer seen as being an entirely negative situation, but the significant difficulties of being a female ruler during the Tudor period are still acknowledged.

The primary sources being used for research on Tudor courts and Mary Tudor specifically have not changed much, but the ways in which they are examined have. Traditionally, calendars of state papers from both England and other regions, especially Spain, France, and Venice, have been used as some of the biggest sources for primary information. They are so commonly used because they collect documents, otherwise known as state papers, pertaining to a specific country during a set period of time in one place and as such can provide more extensive views of overarching themes and interactions. These documents include letters between ambassadors and rulers, as well as letters to and from various advisors and the rulers for whom they worked.

State papers are incredibly useful but, as Gunn points out, there are important issues that must be kept in mind when they are being used. For example, ambassadors were sometimes "prone to sententious and ill-informed generalization" about who was in favor at court, and because of language barriers, might have had some difficulty fully understanding the dynamics

¹⁴ Herrup, "Kings Two Genders."

of court politics.¹⁵ It is also necessary to note that not all ambassadors had the same kind of access to monarchs and other important courtiers. The second issue with state papers, specifically domestic ones, is that they can portray the court as much more congenial and cohesive than it actually was. The behind-the-scenes, secretive dealings that took place might not be evident in these papers.¹⁶

The study of Tudor court politics and Mary Tudor has changed significantly over time. There is now a general understanding that Mary Tudor was not simply a puppet used by various councilors or advisors to achieve their own ends and that Tudor courts and personal relationships were far more important than previously believed. While court studies and histories of the life of Mary Tudor have necessarily intersected, there has been less focus on the interaction between Mary and court politics. By combining these two ideas and looking more directly at how Mary Tudor interacted with her court and courtiers, it will be possible to focus on the interaction between the monarch and the court, instead of one or the other. This approach is something that Mears calls for in her review.¹⁷

II.

When Mary Tudor came to power, she reclaimed the crown from Lady Jane Grey who had gained it after the death of Mary's younger brother Edward VI. Jane's extremely short reign is relatively unimportant and did not cause much change in the Tudor dynasty. She was never truly the queen and had no opportunity to rule during her few days in power. What is

¹⁵ Gunn, "Structures of Politics," 64-65.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 68.

¹⁷ Mears, "Courts, Courtiers, and Culture," 718-719.

important to understanding Mary's position as a monarch in the Tudor legacy, though, is her half-brother Edward VI, whose reign had been controlled by two Lord Protectors that had ruled in place of the child-king. These men, Edward Seymour the Duke of Somerset and John Dudley the Earl of Warwick, made decisions regarding Edward and the realm. This resulted in the politics and relationships of this court being decidedly different from those of the first two Tudor monarchs, Henry VII and Henry VIII. Proximity to the monarch was still important and the Privy Chamber was not totally changed, as Loades points out in his book, but Edward did not rule in his own right; power was centered at court with his protectors and councilors.

When Mary gained the throne, many significant changes took place. Despite being the first female monarch, she ruled in her own right and so the institution of Lord Protector no longer played a role. While there were certainly people who felt that a woman was incapable of ruling on her own, at least among her council and court there were no attempts to take away any of her legal power. In fact, when Mary overthrew Jane Grey, members of her council wanted to have Parliament convene in order to make Mary the legitimate heir (she had been declared a bastard previously due to her father's divorce from her mother) even before her coronation.¹⁸ This desire to solidify Mary's claim to the throne speaks to a recognition by her council of her right to rule, but also an acknowledgment of the dangers of a female monarch whose claim to the throne was anything less than perfect.

Despite this support and desire to protect her claim, there was still obvious confusion over how she, as a single

¹⁸ Alice Hunt, "The Monarchical Republic Of Mary I," *The Historical Journal* 52, no. 3 (2009).

woman, was going to rule. Women had very few legal rights regarding property, money, and inheritance, and what few legal rights they did have, they lost upon marriage. A married woman might have fewer legal rights, but this was because she was expected to allow her husband to guide her. In the case of Mary Tudor, the guidance aspect of the husband/wife relationship was expected and desired, but significant work went into making sure she was not as vulnerable to the whims of a husband as a common English woman would have been. The expectation of guidance and the need of a husband to help her rule is evinced by the way the royal marriage is discussed by the Emperor Charles V.¹⁹ Charles' input on the matter is significant because it is representative of ideas about female monarchs in Europe, but also because Charles was in constant contact with his ambassadors at court who were dealing directly with the Queen. While Herrup's argument about the English valuing feminine traits in their monarchs may be true, there was still a rush to find Mary a husband in order to properly balance those feminine traits. The perceived need to quickly find Mary a husband was also due to Mary's age and the need for an heir. She was in her late 30's when she came to the throne and had never married or had children.

Understanding what power Mary had and how it was perceived helps frame the relationships Mary had with some of the men who helped her rule. It also allows for a better understanding of why these relationships were significant and how they compare to those of other Tudor monarchs. One of

¹⁹ 'Spain: August 1553, 1-5,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*, Volume 11, 1553, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 127-150.

these men, and one of the earliest and most important advisors to the Queen, was Simon Renard. An ambassador to England from the Holy Roman Empire, Renard worked for the Emperor Charles V. He had a very close relationship with Mary, mainly at the beginning of her reign, and was instrumental in the negotiations that made her marriage to Philip II of Spain, the Emperor's son, possible. As head imperial ambassador, Renard was in constant communication with the Emperor regarding political matters in England and particularly at court. Many of these communications are compiled in the Spanish Calendar of State Papers, which combine documents regarding the Holy Roman Empire, England, and Spain.

The letters between Simon Renard and the Emperor, as well as those between Renard and the Queen, provide important insights into both how Mary Tudor's court functioned, and how she related to her Privy Council and other advisors. They also shed light on how Mary's relationship with court politics was both different from and similar to those before her. Her relationship with Renard is representative of a slightly different kind of political atmosphere, mostly at the beginning of her reign. Some of the letters from her first year as Queen speak to the closeness of their relationship, with Mary specifically asking Renard to sneak into the Tower of London to see her.²⁰ In a letter from later on that same year, Renard mentions that Mary wanted him to start "communicating openly" with her, which illustrates even further the close and private nature of their

²⁰ 'Spain: October 1553, 11-15,' in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11, 1553, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 285-302.

relationship up to that point.²¹ As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, in Tudor courts prior to Mary's accession to the throne, the Privy Chamber had been an important political sphere, with those courtiers who were able to gain positions in the Monarch's personal quarters also gaining direct access to the monarch. As a woman, Mary's Privy Chamber was restricted almost entirely to women who may have been able to sway her in some minimal ways, but it was fundamentally different in function from those that came before it because it was a far less political body than it would have been for a king. Renard's ability to be physically close to the Queen and her desire to have him close is telling. The Queen did not have the constant presence of male courtiers around her, but she did choose an advisor to be with her and helping her, and she chose one who was both not on her council and not English.

The close relationship between Mary and Renard, as well as Renard's interactions with the council, provide much information on Mary's relationship to her council. These relationships show a queen with authority but with a complicated and often strained connection to the men whose job it was to help her rule. Mary, upon coming to the throne, had retained some of the councilors who had worked with and for her brother and even her father. She made many changes to put people who shared her interests and ambitions into positions of power but was restrained by her supporters' lack of experience.²² She was, to some extent, surrounded by people who were not always in agreement with her or whom she did not know very well, and in

²¹ 'Spain: December 1553, 16-20,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*, Volume 11, 1553, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 439-446.

²² Loades, *Intrigue and Treason*, 128.

some cases may have even been complacent in plots against her. Loades points out that Mary's council was made up of three types of men: those who had been her long-time supporters or who had joined her cause early on, those who had been members of Edward's council, and those who had been on the council of Henry VIII.²³ Some of these men stand out as being especially important. Out of the first group, Robert Rochester is notable for his long-term support of the Queen as well as for being the comptroller. William Paget, Henry FitzAlan the Earl of Arundel, and the Marquis Of Winchester were members of the second group. The third group included men such as Thomas Howard, the Duke of Norfolk and Stephen Gardiner, the Bishop of Winchester.²⁴ Gardiner was especially important because of his role as Lord Chancellor.

Due to the make-up of her council and the uneasiness this would have caused, it is reasonable that she relied considerably on the Imperial Ambassador, Renard. He was a Catholic and worked for Charles V, her cousin and former intended husband, whom she referred to as her father in her correspondence with him.²⁵ The way that Mary interacted with Renard and her council becomes especially clear shortly after her coronation, when the question of her marriage quickly became the most important topic at court. There was a split among her advisors and councilors over whether she ought to marry Edward Courtenay, an Englishman, or Prince Phillip II of Spain. This event is one of the first times we see divisions at court and how Mary dealt with them.

²³ Ibid, 128-129.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ 'Spain: August 1553, 1-5,' in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11.

Mary herself seems to have been leaning towards Philip from the start, and certainly this was the side of Renard and the Emperor. Most of Renard's correspondence with the Emperor, from the day he met the queen until she married Phillip, addressed the marriage at least briefly. In the first letter the ambassadors sent the Emperor after meeting with Mary for the first time, Renard mentions that he brought up the marriage.²⁶ This early discussion of marriage gives an insight into what Mary felt comfortable keeping from her council and what she was willing to do, whether or not it was something they genuinely favored. The ambassadors wrote that the queen, "had heard that we had represented to the Council that your Majesty did not approve of her marrying a foreigner, but had understood that it had been said to serve the exigencies of the moment, and did not represent your real view."²⁷ Mary was, at least according to the ambassadors, perfectly alright with lying to her council or having others lie to her council in order to do what she thought best, which was often what Charles V wanted, but not always.

In this same letter, the ambassadors also hint at how Mary viewed her own authority over and influence on her council. Mary wanted to have a Catholic funeral for her brother Edward but many around her were encouraging her not to move forward too quickly with changes regarding religion. The Queen was adamant that she had always been honest about her faith and apparently, "She was sure her Council would make no objections, for though several of them would only consent out of dissimulation and fear, she would use their dissimulation for a great end."²⁸ Ultimately, Mary was talked out of having an

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

official Catholic funeral for Edward, but her belief that she was able to control the council or at least intimidate them, and her willingness to go against even the advice of the Emperor, speaks to her assessment of her own power and shows that she was willing to use that power to do what she wished. That it took a significant effort to convince her that the funeral was a bad idea is indicative of how much of a threat her intentions were. She may have been somewhat optimistic about her ability to convince her council of her plan, but she was still in a position of authority over them. She was becoming aware of the fact that pushing too hard and forcing matters, while within her capabilities, was not always the best course of action for a monarch.

As the marriage negotiations continued behind the scenes, the changing nature of Mary's relationship with her council becomes evident. Renard continued to meet with Mary to discuss the possibility of marriage, and Mary made it obvious that she wanted to go along with what the Emperor wanted, but that she needed support in bringing it up to her council and convincing them. Once she was assured of the Emperor's desire to have her married to his son, she requested that he send her and various members of her council letters suggesting the importance of marriage, "without mentioning anyone or specifying any match," a request she made on the grounds that she had always rejected any suggestion of marriage and that it would be strange if she were to bring it up suddenly.²⁹ Renard rejected the idea that she needed backup in this, which speaks to the ways in which those who were not royals or members of the council interpreted her authority.³⁰ Ultimately, a middle-ground

²⁹ 'Spain: October 1553, 11-15,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11*.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

was reached wherein Renard provided a list of points that Mary could bring up to her council in order to convince them of the marriage. He included this list in a letter sent to the Emperor on October 15, 1553.³¹

This list is indicative of how Mary interacted with her council after her rise to power, but before her marriage to Philip II. Renard included a point on the list that stated,

The principal consideration is your Majesty's inclination, for once that has been made known it is to be believed that your Council and all others who desire your prosperity and repose will adopt and conform to it, whether your choice falls on a foreigner or on a native of this kingdom.³²

This is almost certainly an overstatement of the ease with which the queen would be able to convince her council of a foreign marriage, but it also acknowledges that convincing the council of the marriage was not the only way to get them to agree to it. There was a significant possibility that much of the council would be against the marriage, because to them the threat of a foreigner gaining too much control over the country outweighed any benefits a foreign marriage might have brought. The desire to convince her council of the marriage instead of forcing it – in order to stay on good terms – is not incredibly unique, but it is suggestive of a monarch whose relationship with her councilors was such that they did not function as a means to enact her will

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

in the way that many proponents of the “strong king” idea believe her father’s did.³³

Her desire to get the full advice of her council, as well as Renard, is also indicative of how she viewed her ability to make decisions as a single woman. The people around her, and those she seems to have trusted most, all believed that she needed a council of men and a husband to help her make the best choices for the country, and she agreed with them, at least in some situations. While this paper does not intend to single Mary out and view her only through the lens of “First Female Monarch”, it must be remembered that she was a woman who had already lived a large portion of her life not expecting to become queen, and for much of it not even being eligible to be queen.

Cynthia Herrup makes a convincing argument that both masculine and feminine qualities were, to the English, desirable in a ruler and that like the idea of the king’s “two bodies”, there could also be an idea of the king’s “two genders.” If Mary as a monarch was different from Mary as a woman, then her gender as monarch also played a different role than her gender as a woman.³⁴ As a woman, Mary’s gender was almost entirely negative in terms of legal and social rights and status. In the inherited position of monarch, at least some feminine traits were valued as they provided balance to a position which could easily allow a person to become tyrannical or violent.³⁵ At the same time, Herrup also recognizes that, “The gender hierarchy, it was believed, was more natural and older than the political one.”³⁶ Mary’s womanhood was not canceled out by her position, and

³³ Gunn, “Structures of Politics,” 59.

³⁴ Herrup, “King’s Two Genders.”

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

she still had to work to make sure she was appearing as balanced as possible and not coming across as being overly influenced by anyone and thus appearing weak.³⁷

With this in mind, Mary's relationship with her council and advisors is easier to understand. Mary used male advisors to provide support and balance and to back her up, but she still had to maintain authority over them. The desire for the balance provided by male advisors can be seen even more during the later parts of the marriage negotiations. By November of 1553, the negotiations had moved even further and Renard had become more of a go-between for Mary and her council. On November 4th, Renard wrote to the emperor once again regarding the marriage and stated that the Queen, "wishes me to press the Chancellor for audience until he gives a downright refusal, in which case as soon as he asks for audience of the Queen she will find out why he has refused me."³⁸ This is not the only instance in which Renard makes reference to his position as an intermediary for Mary and her council and a lobbyist on behalf of Mary's cause. In a letter written on October 31st, 1553, Renard relayed a discussion with the queen in which he told her about the council members he had spoken to about the marriage and she encouraged him to speak to the Lord Chancellor.³⁹ Again on December 8th, 1553, Renard was summoned by the council to speak about the articles of marriage so that they could get the

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ 'Spain: November 1553, 1-5,' in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11, 1553, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 331-337.

³⁹ 'Spain: October 1553, 26-31,' in Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11, 1553, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 316-331.

best idea of the queen's will.⁴⁰ Based on this evidence, Renard seems to have maintained this position in some form until Philip and Mary were married. This is indicative not just of Mary's use of male advisors, but also of the closeness between her and Renard, her chosen advisor, and the strain that existed between her and some members of her council.

Renard's presence was most important in the period between Mary's accession and her marriage to Philip, but as his importance began to fade, another man stepped in to become one of Mary's key advisors. Reginald Pole was a cousin of Mary's and a cardinal of the Catholic Church. He had been away from England for years, living in Rome as a result of the religious upheaval in his home country. Pole was made papal legate to England in 1553 and returned to the country to work with and advise Mary on bringing the Catholic faith back to England. His relationship with Mary was notably different from Renard's, as he was a relative of the queen and from the same country. Pole's singular devotion to restoring the Catholic Church in England and obeying the Pope often led him to be quite frank. He often wrote in ways that the people receiving his letters would have found to be out of line, and the queen and others who occupied positions of power in England were not exempt from these letters.⁴¹ In one letter to Mary, written in October 1553, prior to his return to England, Pole's brashness and priorities are particularly evident.

⁴⁰ 'Spain: December 1553, 1-10,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11, 1553*, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 407-423.

⁴¹ Rex Pogson, "Reginald Pole and the Priorities of Government in Mary Tudor's Church," *The Historical Journal* 18, no. 1 (1975), 8.

How could it be reasonable for the Queen to dissemble this cause of the union and obedience of the Church, and to hide this light under the bushel, Christ having placed her on the throne, that she might set it on a candlestick to be seen by the whole kingdom, and to give light to everybody? and how can it become her to do this from fear of turmoil, after having been freed by Christ from such manifest perils, when she was destitute of all human aid and protection, He showing that his hand is with her, and that it has dispersed the storm which was coming against her?⁴²

Another letter written in August of that same year is also quite strong in its unsolicited appeal for Mary to be obedient to the Catholic Church and Pope.⁴³ It is unclear exactly how Mary felt about Pole's forwardness as she had a close relationship with the cardinal, but still she was monarch. Pole began attempting to advise Mary as soon as she came to the throne, but even though he and Mary had the same goals in relation to religion, the pull of Renard and the Emperor closer to home kept her from making any quick moves on the matter. Once in England Pole had significant influence, which is evident in both his own writings and those of others collected in the Venetian calendar of state papers.

⁴² 'Spain: October 1553, 1-5,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11, 1553*, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 261-272.

⁴³ 'Spain: August 1553, 11-20,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11, 1553*, ed. Royall Tyler (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), 162-176.

According to Rex Pogson, Reginald Pole did not care for the normal workings of court politics. He states:

Pole avoided the tedium of administrative business – he never attended Council meetings – and Philip tactfully suggested that the legate should avoid the petty details of government and concentrate on larger policies. Throughout his life Pole acknowledged this preference for contemplation over action.⁴⁴

But Pogson also points out that Pole was an important advisor to the Queen, the most important advisor according to the Venetian ambassador at court.⁴⁵ Pole may not have attended council meetings, and his brashness may have been too much even for Philip sometimes, but the king still placed him in a position of authority when he was out of the country (which was often). Lack of manners aside, Pole did have the same religious objectives as Mary and her husband, and his intentions were well known. In one letter written by the Venetian ambassador Giovanni Michiel to the Doge, Pole is described as being “utterly devoid of all ambition and desire;”⁴⁶ he was not working for his own benefit. Philip and Mary could be reasonably sure that Pole was guided only by the Pope and his own faith, so that even if his

⁴⁴ Pogson, “Priorities of Government,” 4.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ 'Venice: April 1555, 1-15,' in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 6, 1555-1558*, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), 35-51.

advice could not always be implemented because of its brashness, it was honest.

While Mary did not heed Pole's advice at the immediate start of her reign, she wrote to him a few months later in January of 1554. In her letter she informs him of the religious situation in the country, specifically about married priests and heretics, and asks his advice, "that she may be better acquainted with his opinion; and also learn, by what way, without scruple of conscience, she could provide for the said churches until the obedience of the Catholic and Apostolic Church be again established in England".⁴⁷ This letter speaks to the fact that Mary was already seeking out help from Pole relatively early in her reign and that she saw the need to look outside of her council for advice regarding the religious situation in England. As with Renard and the Emperor, Mary was seeking the advice of people whom she felt she could trust and with whom she already had a relationship.

Pole's role was not strictly advisory, in fact part of his legatine mission was to help broker a peace between France and the Emperor Charles V.⁴⁸ On this project he worked specifically with the queen and her council. On April 20th, 1555, Pole wrote

⁴⁷ 'Venice: January 1554,' in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Volume 5, 1534-1554, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1873), 451-456.

⁴⁸ 'Venice: May 1555, 1-15,' in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Volume 6, 1555-1558, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), 59-72.

to the Bishop of Conza informing him of the status of the negotiations and explaining to him that the queen had sent him a letter that she intended to send to the King of France. In the letter he also mentions that the queen had chosen members of her council as well as himself to go to the official peace negotiations.⁴⁹ Pole may not have attended council meetings but he was certainly involved in the workings of court politics and government. Like Renard, his position within the court fell outside the lines of a normal councilor, and yet this did not stop him from being actively involved in politics and decision-making.

After Mary and Philip wed, it is clear that the atmosphere at the court was altered, and that Mary's role changed in some ways as well. During the marriage negotiations, both Mary and her council worked hard to make sure that her legal position did not change and that Philip was unable to make decisions regarding the English government without the queen's consent. Still, letters from all sides after the marriage show the rising importance and influence of Phillip at court. This ties into the idea that Judith Richards brings up in her article on gender and the Tudor monarchy that, "Despite those declarations, the contemporary understandings of husband/wife relationships were such that few believed that, once married, Mary could continue to function as fully autonomous monarch".⁵⁰ This may be true, but it does not mean that Mary was totally stripped of her power by any means; on this point Pole's letters are again

⁴⁹ 'Venice: April 1555, 16-30,' in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Volume 6, 1555-1558, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), 51-59.

⁵⁰ Richards, "Sole Quene," 908.

important to a full understanding of Mary's relationship to politics at her court after her marriage.

In a letter from the Cardinal to King Philip, informing him of the queen's actions at court during his absence, Pole writes:

Concerning the most Serene Queen and her assiduity in the despatch of business, she is so intent on it as to require her energy in this matter to be checked rather than stimulated, for besides passing the greater part of the day in this occupation, she then, should there be anything to write to his Majesty (as is always the case), this sort of office delighting her extremely, performs it during the greater part of the night, to the injury of her health, as known to the King, who alone can apply a remedy.⁵¹

This letter suggests that despite the marriage, Mary still took her position as monarch very seriously and worked just as hard as she ever had. It also implies that this was the norm for Mary, and that the king was aware of this because of her regular letters. So, while Philip may have been taking on part of the governing of the kingdom in a way that the English had hoped he would not, he was not becoming overly powerful, and Mary wanted him involved in some way as evinced by her desire to keep him informed. Mary recognized that she was still the ultimate

⁵¹ 'Venice: October 1555, 1-15,' in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice, Volume 6, 1555-1558*, ed. Rawdon Brown (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1877), 199-214.

authority and that she had to work with her advisors and council on state business. This letter from Pole to King Philip is also representative of the sort of committee that Philip put together to watch Mary and look over her while he was gone, which is indicative of the kind of control he wanted to have.

A sense of Mary's level of influence on Philip's power at court also emerges from the writings of Reginald Pole. Work done by Judith Richards suggests that Philip's increased political and court power was not just the result of a gendered power imbalance but of an intentional situation in which Mary "insisted" that Philip be given power.⁵² The above excerpt from Pole's letter is, at the very least, evidence that Mary wished for Philip to be informed and involved in some way in the work she was doing at court. Mary seems to have wanted Philip to play a similar role to that of Renard and Pole, but due to his own ideas about how much power he should have had and his frequent absences, he was both unwilling and unable to meet her expectations. Philip may have wanted more power so that he could act as a king in a more traditional sense, but he never truly attained that kind of authority. Any power that he had was constrained by the marriage agreement and the will of Mary and her government. This understanding of the situation acknowledges that Mary was still a monarch and was legally entitled to the final say in all matters at court. As such, she could not be written off as a weak and incompetent leader and political player during this period. To assume that Mary was a puppet or a minor player in court politics even after her marriage is to discount her legal authority and agency

Mary's relationships with her advisors, Simon Renard and Reginald Pole, allow for a look into how she interacted with her

⁵² Herrup, "King's Two Genders."

court, as well as how the court and council functioned, but they also allow for a comparison with Tudor courts in a more general sense. By doing this, it is possible to place Mary Tudor and her court into the context of a Tudor monarch, instead of looking at her as something separate from the rest of her family. In order to do this it is also necessary to look at how the three major themes in court studies discussed in the historiography apply to the Marian court.

In *Intrigue and Treason*, David Loades touches on the idea of the “strong king”, one of the most important themes. He argues that, despite various attempts to sway him, Henry VIII did what he wanted. If Henry wanted something to happen, it did not matter what the people around him desired.⁵³ The situation with Edward was, of course, considerably different as he was a minor who was being guided by two different Lord Protectors. As a child, Edward was not even legally able to rule on his own so while his input may have been considered sometimes, he certainly did not have the final say on politics at court. The concept of Mary provided by the letter’s regarding her reign, is much more like Henry in this sense than Edward. In particular, prior to her marriage to Philip, Mary recognized that she was able to do what she wished despite what her council may have wanted. This is especially evident in her insistence that she would have a Catholic burial for Edward and that her council was going to have to accept it.⁵⁴ Later on in her reign, she differed from her advisors and husband more often, but as Herrup and Judith Richards both suggest, it is possible that this

⁵³ Loades, “*Intrigue and Treason*,” 9.

⁵⁴ 'Spain: August 1553, 1-5,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*, Volume 11.

was actually another example of Mary's authority.⁵⁵ If Mary was actively choosing which advisors had access to her and how much control Philip was being given, then in a sense that bolsters the idea that Mary's personal rule was stronger than previously assumed and not as different from her father's as might be expected.

While it is unclear exactly how much Mary was able to override her advisors, it is clear that she was no Edward, but she was also not her sister, Elizabeth. While Mary was able to assert her power over her council and people trying to sway her, she was still influenced, and in some ways defined, by gender roles. To a certain extent, Elizabeth was able to escape the gendering of her court and in some sense the removal (or perhaps in the case of Mary, perceived removal) of her power and authority, by remaining unmarried.

In terms of the role of and importance of the Privy Chamber, Loades notes that the study of the Marian regime has not focused much on the court, "beyond noticing that the political development of the Privy Chamber, which had been going on from the 1490s, was checked and almost destroyed by its conversion into a female precinct in 1553."⁵⁶ So while it may not be possible to compare the privy chambers of other Tudor monarchs to that of Mary Tudor, it is possible to look at how the court adjusted. The importance of the Privy Chamber lay in the closeness and access to the monarch that it gave to the men who were a part of it. This was true for Henry as well as for Edward, as evinced by the attempts to get close to him that made up the boy king's relationship with Thomas Seymour. While Loades uses the relationship between Seymour and Edward as a way of

⁵⁵ Herrup, "King's Two Genders."

⁵⁶ Loades, "*Intrigue and Treason*," VII.

proving a point about intrigue at court, it also brings up just how much influence could conceivably be had by the people closest to the monarch.⁵⁷

Although the Privy Chamber had become a significantly less political sphere and an almost totally female one, closeness to the queen outside of that space was still extremely important. This can be seen very clearly in the relationship between Simon Renard and Mary, where Renard had more influence than most and certainly had a significant level of access to the queen. The intimacy of the relationship between Renard and Mary is evident in a letter that Mary sent to Renard early on in her reign.

Sir: If it were not too much trouble for you, and if you were to find it convenient to do so without the knowledge of your colleagues, I would willingly speak to you in private this evening, as you four are to come to-morrow. Nevertheless, I remit my request to your prudence and discretion. Written in haste, as it well appears, this morning, 13 October. Your good friend, Mary.⁵⁸

In another letter, Renard references being in Mary's more private rooms, which also speaks to his closeness to the queen and his access to her private spaces at court.⁵⁹ There is less evidence for Reginald Pole's physical proximity to Mary, but there is a significant amount of evidence for the closeness of their

⁵⁷ Loades, "*Intrigue and Treason*," 66-68.

⁵⁸ 'Spain: August 1553, 1-5,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*, Volume 11.

⁵⁹ 'Spain: October 1553, 26-31,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain*, Volume 11.

relationship in terms of religion and matters of state. Two of the letters looked at earlier in this paper are relevant to this close relationship, specifically the letter in which Pole mentions that Mary had sent him a letter to look over and the letter in which Mary asks Pole for his advice on matters of religion.⁶⁰ Even though there is less evidence that Pole was physically near Mary, she actively sought out his advice and it is likely he was at least aware of what she was doing in her private space based on his letter to Philip regarding her late-night letter writing habits.

Mary had to choose whom she wanted both physically and politically close to her because in her case, there was no official system in place. In a sense, this gave her a level of power and control over who could influence her politics that even the ultimate “strong king”, Henry VIII, did not have. The strategy, and social and political niceties that might have gone into choosing the members of a male monarch’s Privy Chamber did not concern Mary. She was able to surround herself only with those people whom she believed would either agree with her or help her to achieve her goals. People could still attempt to get close to Mary, but as a woman, no man could be physically or politically close to her or be in her chambers without her specific invitation.

Finally, Simon Renard and Reginald Pole’s relationships with Mary and descriptions of the court reveal much about factionalism. Loades defines faction as “settled groupings pursuing consistent aims.”⁶¹ In this sense, there was very little factionalism at the court of Mary Tudor, especially if groups that contain the monarch herself cannot be considered true factions,

⁶⁰ 'Venice: April 1555, 16-30,' in *Calendar of State Papers Relating To English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, Volume 6.

⁶¹ Loades, “*Intrigue and Treason*,” 294.

as they are not attempting to sway the queen, but to achieve what she has already signaled or admitted to wanting. A group trying to, for example, further the restoration of the Catholic Church, was not truly a faction because it was trying to advance the Queen's agenda, not convince her of something new.

Simon Renard believed there was factionalism at court, reporting in a letter to the Emperor sent early in December 1553 that the council was "torn by faction."⁶² Another letter from Renard to the Emperor speaks to the perceived presence of faction even more, this time with the faction being mentioned by the queen herself as she spoke to her Privy Council on the matter of the royal marriage agreement.

That very day, she said, she had sent for the Council to come to her chamber, declared all the foregoing to them, and said she trusted them to do their duty; they must not give way to faction or weaken in their devotion to her, upon which the honour and welfare of the realm depended, and she, for her part, would do her utmost to support and help them. They replied with one voice that they would do their duty and die at her feet to serve her.⁶³

Mary was clearly aware that traditional factionalism could be dangerous, and asked her councilors that they not fall prey to it. While factionalism may have been present within the council, the kind of faction that was present was not of the variety that was meant to sway the monarch either one way or the other in the

⁶² 'Spain: December 1553, 1-10,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11*.

⁶³ 'Spain: December 1553, 16-20,' in *Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 11*.

way that it had with other Tudor monarchs. Division is probably a better word to describe what was then considered factionalism. Pole and Renard both had specific political goals, and as such were seemingly as prone to factionalism as anyone else, but their relationship with the queen meant that their allegiances to various groups were not intended to sway Mary but to help her sway others. Renard was part of a group that wanted Philip to become Mary's husband, while Pole wanted to further the cause of Catholicism in England; however, these two men were not necessarily pushing Mary towards these goals, as she seemed to already have wanted the first, and she most certainly wanted the second.

The Marian Court differed greatly from any of the courts that came before it. This fact appears obvious, and though it could be easily written off as the result of the transition to the first female monarch, it is not as simple as that. The writings of and about the people closest to the queen bring to light just how complicated the political situation was at court. Mary Tudor had a unique relationship with her council and male courtiers that combined aspects of the courts that had come before hers, while also creating new ways of handling politics at court. She communicated with her council on her own terms and used intermediaries if she did not want to communicate directly. Instead of choosing a council to enact her will, she did her best with a council with which she did not always get along and used her authority as monarch to give precedence to those advisors and councilors with whom she did get along such as Simon Renard and Reginald Pole.

Mary Tudor had strong ideas about what she wanted on certain matters, religion being one of the most obvious, and she did what she could to get her way. She clearly recognized her own authority and her ability to override her council, but she was also

aware, or at least became aware, of the fact that forcing too much on the Privy Council was not in her best interest. Her court had a very different makeup than what she might have wanted and her relationship with them – as can be seen from the glimpses of her interaction we get from the letters of Renard and Pole – was not particularly close or comfortable. She used the people she trusted and wanted around her as intermediaries to communicate with her council and to advise her, instead of relying exclusively on her council. In a way, Reginald Pole and Simon Renard were Mary's substitutes for likeminded people on her council, as well as for a Privy Chamber. They were Catholics and had always been Catholics, and they helped her to communicate with politicians on whom she relied to help her run her country. Mary Tudor still headed up her council and made decisions with them and with their help and advice, but she also relied on her chosen advisors to make that relationship smoother and more successful.

Ultimately, Mary Tudor's court, when looked at in the context of other Tudor courts and the themes that have defined them, is less of an outlier than it is often made out to be. Many of the traditional systems that had been in place before she came to power were not so much done away with as they were significantly reworked and changed, and even those that were done away with were replaced in some respect. The court had previously been characterized by defined physical spaces, which could be political, private, or both; however, the Marian court was different. Proximity to the monarch was still important but the defined spaces of the court became significantly less so. The Marian court was a network of people for whom influence and power were not always based in the ability to be present in the queen's private spaces but in how well one could communicate with her through the channels she allowed, even if direct contact was best.

Mary Tudor was a monarch with the same legal powers as the monarchs who had come before her. What she wanted she was able to make happen, although she was sometimes convinced that it was in her best interest to slow down or not to enforce her will at all. The closer an advisor was to her, the more influential they could be, because a direct relationship with the monarch was still the quickest, albeit more difficult, means of influencing politics. Mary was not as strong as her father but she was not totally ruled by the men around her either. The English court and government did not cease to work properly when Mary Tudor was crowned. They adjusted as was necessary based on the gendered nature of the period, and continued to work towards legal and social change as they always had. Mary Tudor found a way to work within the system that allowed her some level of control and influence despite her gender and perceived weakness, even if her power was much less than that of her father and grandfather. Without reinventing court politics or the monarch-courtier relationship, Mary Tudor participated in court politics and functioned as a monarch more than has often been assumed in the past.

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Ghosts of Violence

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Discussions of Latin America's coloniality and post-coloniality often come up against the question of colonialism's universality. Scholars argue that in many ways Latin America does not fit into the typical framework of post-colonial critique, specifically the simplified binaries this field implicitly relies on and/or gives power to. On the other hand, some scholars argue that acknowledging the complexity of categories and power structures in Latin America does not preclude that these same binaries have had a profound effect on the development of colonial and post-colonial Latin America. Mario Roberto Morales argues along the lines of the former, namely that the field of post-colonial theory/subalternist studies does not make room for the complex reality of *mestizaje*. Cristina Rojas de Ferro and James Sanders in their arguments about liberalism, conservatism and alternative modernity in Latin America in many ways support Morales' assertion that typical binaries between colonizer and colonized do not apply in Latin America. Jens Andermann's critique of museums and exhibitionism, on the other hand, points out that elite criollo power in Brazil and Argentina co-opted a past of Otherness in order to construct a justified colonial present and future. For Andermann, although complex and sometimes invisible, the colonizer's power, as articulated by post-colonial theory/subaltern studies, did make itself unmistakably known in Latin America.

In this essay I will first outline the merit in connecting Morales, Rojas de Ferro and Sanders in order to understand the complexity with which Latin American coloniality developed and the insufficiency of simplified binaries. Then I will turn to Andermann and a more nuanced understanding of Morales, Sanders and Rojas de Ferro to argue that a violent and complex

colonial power structure nevertheless permeates many of these discussions and their material implications. I would like to note that I intentionally discuss discourses from Mexico, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina in this essay, not to assume that they can be homogenized into one history but to make a broader theoretical argument and show historical commonalities. I use these four texts because they cover a range of regions in Latin America, thus highlighting differences as well as common threads that are central to my argument. I specifically use Morales and Andermann because they point out similar historical phenomenon while making distinct arguments, a tension that is essential to the central intervention I make.

Morales argues that “this complex reality [namely that of *mestizaje*] demands that the analysis be located at the vortex of the articulation of the ethno- and sociocultural differences that make the conflictive intercultural dynamics of these subjects possible, and not in the extremes of those differences...”¹ *Mestizaje* best translates literally as “mixing” and refers not only to the biological mixing of races but especially religious and cultural mixing as well. For Morales, the phenomenon of *mestizaje* means that an analysis based on an oppositional binary does not work here. He points to two specific factors that characterize the nature of *mestizaje* in Latin America as significantly different from that in other colonized regions of the world.² First, Spain and Portugal themselves were intensely *mestizaje*, more so than other colonial powers, especially in the coexistence of Christianity, Islam and Judaism on the Iberian Peninsula. As such, they came to (what would be) Latin America with *mestizaje*

¹ Mario Roberto Morales, “Peripheral Modernity and Differential *Mestizaje* in Latin America: Outside Subalternist Postcolonialism,” *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2008), 489.

² *Ibid.*

dynamics already ingrained in their social and political networks. In addition, the mestizaje process consisted not only of the Europeanization of indigenous groups, as one might expect, but also included “a process of Americanization or Indianization of the European subject and culture, a mestizaje that flows from the subaltern toward the dominant group, be it forced or voluntary...”³ For Morales, the role of mestizaje in Latin America means that a simple binary between colonizer and colonized in the development of Latin American coloniality is not applicable.

Significant here is that Morales does not reject the existence of a (colonial) power hierarchy in Latin America. He acknowledges that criollos were elites at the top of the power structure and that they imposed colonial ideas on lower classes with social and political consequences in a variety of ways.⁴ However, Morales believes that, for the reasons I articulate above, the criollo experienced a kind of schizophrenia in relation to his social and political position because “the criollo is neither a colonizer nor a colonized, but at times he is both and tries to behave more as a colonizer than a colonized.”⁵ This schizophrenia was most visible in the tension between the public and private criollo self, where the public was defined by Europeaness and the private was defined by Indian-like mestizaje.⁶ The criollo, in this imagination, was (is) never just a colonizer but rather, just as significantly, also embodied (embodies) the deep psychological paralysis of the colonized. After offering a reading of post-colonial and subalternist

³ Morales, “Peripheral Modernity and Differential Mestizaje,” 491.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Morales, “Peripheral Modernity and Differential Mestizaje,” 496.

⁶ Ibid.

theorists like Edward Said and Gayatri Spivak, Morales concludes that what he terms the postcolonial-subalternist-apparatus cannot adequately account for the strong influence that such differences *within* Latin America and within Spain and Portugal had on colonialism.⁷

James Sanders' essay "The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Contesting Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Latin America" begins with the intervention that the origins and spread of modernity in the mid-1800s came not only from Europe towards the Americas but rather spread also from the Americas toward Europe. Sanders makes this claim by describing the emergence of an alternative modernity, liberal republicanism, in Mexico and Colombia. Liberal republicanism, argues Sanders, came from within Latin America and emerged as a dominant discourse for a few decades in the mid-1800s.⁸ Although couched in the linguistic tradition of Europe – rights, liberty, and the dichotomy between civilized and barbaric – this republicanism nevertheless broke from European modernity that was developing at this time. This alternative modernity was "inherently political," and more focused on questions of morality and rights for the greatest number of people than economic rights and prosperity.⁹ Significantly, to provide evidence for his argument, Sanders looks at quotidian media sources that would have been available to a wide range of people, particularly those of lower classes and those who were illiterate. Newspapers (which were often read aloud) especially contained numerous

⁷ Morales, "Peripheral Modernity and Differential Mestizaje," 480.

⁸ James E. Sanders, "The Vanguard of the Atlantic World: Contesting Modernity in Nineteenth-Century Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 46, no. 2 (2011), 105.

⁹ Sanders, "The Vanguard of the Atlantic World," 105, 111, 112.

examples of a discourse supporting republicanism as well as intentional opposition to Europe. Citing several examples, Sanders claims that “republican modernity in the Americas was thus contrasted with European backwardness: slavery, aristocracy, and monarchy.”¹⁰ Although such rhetoric still relies on a (European) binary opposition, it nevertheless articulates a unique imagination of political and social organization among both upper and lower classes in Mexico and Colombia. These were clearly not ideas imposed only from the top down by European or European-like colonizers but rather a complex formation of notions connected to, but also distinct from, colonial European ideas about modernity. The connection to Morales’ argument is clear: rather than a simple binary between the all-powerful (over discourse and political or social organization) colonizer and the powerless (to influence discourse and political or social organization) colonized, the relationship is much more complex. In both cases, the authors argue that a unique space between colonizer and colonized emerged in Latin America to produce *mestizaje* identity and a discourse of alternative modernity.

Cristina Rojas de Ferro in her essay “The ‘will to civilization’ and its encounter with *laissez-faire*” likewise discusses the tensions that emerged between unique Latin American discourses and those of Europe. She points out that contradictory tendencies emerged in the mid-1800s in Colombia, ideologies that were wrestling with the place of *laissez-faire* and morality in Colombian political and economic systems. Rojas de Ferro says that “the debate on the freedom of slaves was raised in the context of the relations of property,” drawing a direct connection to the tension between property rights and human

¹⁰ Sanders, “The Vanguard of the Atlantic World,” 111.

rights that is so familiar under the framework of liberalism.¹¹ Liberals at this time, however, used the language of morality to argue against the institution of slavery. A fervent liberal argued that “laissez-faire signified a rule of conduct which ‘allows robbery, allows oppression, allows the wolf to eat the lambs’” and another thinker maintained that “morality was the precondition for liberty.”¹² This focus on morality aligns with the alternative modernity outlined by Sanders. Other more conservative thinkers, while agreeing that a certain kind of morality was necessary, did not believe that there was “need for a government to accomplish the civilizing task.”¹³ Alongside such opinions were those closely aligned to what we would consider present-day liberalism, namely a focus on ‘interests’ and ‘big companies.’¹⁴ And finally, artisans often “voiced their resistance to laissez-faire principles,” albeit while still arguing for “civilization,” significant at a historical moment often assumed to be dominated by (elite) political economists.¹⁵ Rojas de Ferro cites several examples that portray the artisan voice.¹⁶ Again, language stemming from a European tradition dominated these discussions: liberty, civility versus barbarism, and laissez-faire, for

¹¹ Cristina Rojas de Ferro, “The ‘Will to Civilization’ and its Encounter with Laissez-Faire,” *Review of International Political Economy* 2.1 (Winter 1995), 158.

¹² Rojas de Ferro, “The ‘Will to Civilization’ and its Encounter with Laissez-Faire,” 158-159.

¹³ Rojas de Ferro, “The ‘Will to Civilization’ and its Encounter with Laissez-Faire,” 160.

¹⁴ Rojas de Ferro, “The ‘Will to Civilization’ and its Encounter with Laissez-Faire,” 163.

¹⁵ Rojas de Ferro, “The ‘Will to Civilization’ and its Encounter with Laissez-Faire,” 166, 171.

¹⁶ Ibid.

example. However, at this historical moment, it seems that morality, as opposed to pure economics, was an important question. Indeed, a wide variety of perspectives held their own within the discourse, those clearly pre-capitalist and liberal as well as those more antithetical to what would eventually develop into capitalism and (neo)liberalism. Perhaps even more importantly, a range of social classes was involved in the discourse about how Colombia should organize itself politically, socially and economically. Rojas de Ferro, like Morales and Sanders, implicitly argues that an array of unique discourses – some indeed contesting European and colonizing discourses – developed from within Latin America.

At this point in my essay I have focused on the heterogeneity of voices and discourses coming from various classes within different regions of Latin America, resisting the idea that a simple monolithic discourse or political structure was colonially imposed from the top down, as (according to Morales at least) some post-colonial/subalternist studies frameworks might argue. Now I turn to the introduction and second chapter of Jens Andermann's of *The Optic of the State: Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil* to complicate this perspective that has seemingly set itself in opposition to post-colonial critique of mid-nineteenth century Latin America. Andermann focuses on exhibits and museums in Brazil and Argentina during this period, explaining how indigenous peoples and cultures were captured in museum displays and scenes at various exhibitions. He points out that these exhibits were not only for the colonizing eye to see, but also that their very construction was an exercise of colonizing and nation-building power:

The interior [of Argentina, where scientists searched for artifacts] is a great reservoir of material, living and dead, which needs to be 'rummaged through' to come upon the most striking pieces, stones and bones to which the

museum has already allocated the empty slots they will eventually come to fill. Their destination is clear prior to their discovery.¹⁷

Ethnography justified and explained certain differences, particularly, but not coincidentally, those between white Europeans (at one end of the spectrum) and indigenous people (at the other end of the spectrum).¹⁸ Andermann maintains that “the aim of ethnography...[was] not to understand cultural difference but to illustrate it, as difference is merely a form of noncoevalness, a backwardness in time.”¹⁹ Both quotes illustrate the importance of time as a colonial force operating in the movement between imagined indigenous spaces and the imagined spaces of Latin American elites (in this case, the museum). Ethnography developed as a science in order to find pieces of evidence from an indigenous past that would fit within a narrative *already* created by elites, namely that the current project of nation-building justified colonialism as a break from a backwards and primitive past. Indeed, “as ghosts...Indians once more set free the moving bodies the exhibition had reduced to eternal poses and to the self-sameness of racial types,” invoking racialized bodies as a tool in constructing the immobilized past of indigenous peoples.²⁰ Andermann describes in detail the variety of ways in which specific visual representations of various peoples within Latin America were displayed in connection to the new idea of a nation-state. Thus, he claims, “Brazil...could

¹⁷ Jens Andermann, “Introduction” and “Spectacles of Sacrifice: Inside the Brazilian Anthropological Exhibition,” *The Optic of the State: Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 74.

¹⁸ Andermann, *The Optic of the State*, 68.

¹⁹ Andermann, *The Optic of the State*, 75.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

become modern only to the extent that it was dreaming its own antiquity.”²¹ Brazil’s constructed past was essential to its modern present and future.

Andermann does not explore the category of *mestizaje* the way Morales might want him to. Yet neither does he fall into a trap of simplified oppositional binaries. Key to his argument is that the indigenous Otherness of the past was transformed and incorporated into the nation-building project of the colonizer, where colonizers blurred the line between what is now part of a colonized visuality versus a colonizer’s visuality. As such, this historical narrative as well as the presence of indigenous peoples who still existed in Brazil and Argentina (indeed, those who came from *within* Latin America) had great influence on the political, social and economic development of the region. Incorporation of difference into the happenings of colonial and post-colonial Latin America parallels the argument that Morales, Sanders and Rojas de Ferro present; however, Andermann, seemingly fully aware of the complexity within these dynamics, points out the ways in which the power of the colonizer used such difference for his own violent purposes.

I return to themes from the beginning of the essay to put Morales and Andermann in conversation with each other. Morales’ argument about *mestizaje* does not preclude the possibility that Andermann also makes an important intervention. Both focus on the incorporation of difference into the political, economic and social system set up in the mid-1800s in Latin America. Morales sees such incorporation of difference into the very premise of the system as positive in some ways; it contests conventional colonizer/colonized binaries because biological and ideological mixing were so significant. Andermann, on the other hand, critically points out that while such incorporation of difference was fundamentally necessary for

²¹ Andermann, *The Optic of the State*, 77.

the developments that were happening at the time, this incorporation was also colonizing and violent. The process of mestizaje was indeed violent in a way that Morales does not explicitly acknowledge. While “Americanization” of European/criollo elites occurred on some levels in terms of customs and beliefs, the racial mixing that Morales emphasizes, and the result of which was and is mestizaje, was largely only possible through racialized rape and domination of non-white women. There exists a parallel between the (male) colonial gaze and scientific power over the indigenous object (body) in the museum and the ghost of the male colonial gaze and gendered power over indigenous and mixed women (bodies) within mestizaje. Both constitute the premise of the argument that these respective authors make about the role of diversity and difference in their read of Latin American coloniality. Putting these arguments in tandem highlights that despite the criollo’s schizophrenic position, he still enjoyed many concrete material advantages over lower classes in the racial hierarchy, gendered supremacy being a particularly poignant and disturbing example of their very real, physical consequences. Another example, relating to Andermann’s work, would be the actual physical destruction of indigenous communities and peoples, which made possible their position in a past historical moment and subsequent inclusion into the colonial project of the nation-state. The body in both these cases, that of mestizaje women and that of indigenous peoples put on display in museums, becomes the site of a colonial move into a modern or post-colonial future while simultaneously representing the ghosts of colonial violence that brought them there.

Now I turn to drawing a connection between these material effects and the more theoretical, discursive differences discussed earlier. With regard to language, I might note first that in some ways Morales himself falls into the trap of oppositional binaries by positing a theory of mestizaje as an alternative to

post-colonial theory/subalternist studies understandings of Latin American coloniality. Indeed, his read of post-colonial theory and subalternist studies as a field (that in reality are two very heterogeneous fields) seems unfair because these critiques very much engage with the deconstruction of binaries and question the very premise of representing an Other at all. Regardless, language as both a product and a construct of a colonial framework is significant here, which is why I now return again to Morales, Sanders and Rojas de Ferro. As mentioned previously, all three authors give credence to the influence of the European linguistic tradition even within their arguments about the unique and alternative modes of thinking and structuring society that came out of Latin America. Morales does so more implicitly through his use of a term produced *between* colonizer and colonized (mestizaje), while Sanders and Rojas de Ferro are clear in their references to European categories related to modernity. The fact that all these authors consciously operate to some degree within the conceptual framework of European modernity raises two important points. First, while of course not relying on a simple binary between colonizer and colonized, alternative ways of thinking and true differences within Latin America nevertheless had strong ties to colonialism and European modernity. And second, there is a direct connection between the physical domination of indigenous Latin America mentioned above and the European linguistic tradition. In other words, the inheritance of a colonial European framework is significant precisely because it exposes not only the ideological but also the physical violence contained in the only categories with which we can talk about coloniality and post-coloniality in Latin America. The two cannot be separated from one another. Mestizaje as a concept cannot be understood independent from the structure of colonialism precisely because its linguistic position between Europe's binary of colonizer and colonized contains the violent ghost of racialized and gendered domination in Latin America.

Any reconception of the framework for understanding Latin American post-coloniality must actively acknowledge and reckon with this ghost.

In using Morales' piece as a bookend for this essay, I do not wish to set myself in opposition to his argument. I concur that the criollo in mid-nineteenth century Latin America occupied a schizophrenic position and that mestizaje as both an analytical tool and identity category is legitimate and important. Connecting Morales to Sanders and Rojas de Ferro has proven useful for exploring the complexity of identities, discourses and structures that developed within and in connection to Latin America itself, not just Europe, all of which necessarily complicates the binary between colonizer and colonized. Rather than contest Morales, I have intended to show that there lies a ghost – or rather, multiple ghosts – within his claim about Latin America's ability to depart from more typical post-colonial theory and subalternist studies interventions. The real, material violence – to which those closer to the colonized end of the spectrum were subjected and from which those closer to the colonizer end of the spectrum benefited – cannot be ignored. It is this historical reality (as well as its contemporary implications, not discussed in this essay) that makes moving beyond Europe's colonial legacy so difficult.

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